Go to Wolters Kluwer VitalLaw.comGo to Wolters Kluwer VitalLaw.com
VitalLaw®
  • Find answers to your questions
  • Log in to access your subscriptions
In depth. On point.
In depth. On point.
  • Home
  • Legal Directory
  • Home
  • Legal Directory
In depth. On point.
  • Articles
  • Articles
    • Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
    • Age Discrimination Act of 1975
    • Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988
    • Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
    • Civil Rights Act of 1866--42 USC Section 1981
    • Civil Rights Act of 1866--42 USC Section 1981a
    • Civil Rights Act of 1871--42 USC Section 1983
    • Civil Rights Act of 1871--42 USC Section 1985
    • Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976--42 USC Section 1988
    • Civil Rights Act of 1964--Title VI
    • Civil Rights Act of 1964--Title VII
    • Civil Rights Act of 1991
    • Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
    • Education Amendments of 1972--Title IX
    • Equal Pay Act of 1963
    • Executive Order 11246
    • Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
    • Federal Arbitration Act
    • Government Organization and Employees
    • Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
    • Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
    • Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces--10 USC Section 654
    • Rehabilitation Act of 1973
    • Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
    • Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
    • US Constitution
    • Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
    • Miscellaneous Laws
  • Articles
  • Articles

    Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 46 EPD ¶37,846, Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 10 et al., Defendants., (Mar. 09, 1988), (Mar. 9, 1988)

    Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 10 et al., Defendants.

    United States District Court, Southern District of New York.No. 71 Civ. 2877 (RLC), March 9, 1988

    Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Unions--Liability--Successorship.

    --A union local was the successor in interest to another local that had merged with it and no longer existed as a separate entity, and the successor local could therefore be held accountable for alleged violations of a discrimination decree covering the predecessor. Factors indicating successorship included notice to the successor of potential liability, the inability of the predecessor to provide relief, substantial continuity of operations, overlapping offices and jurisdiction, absorption of the predecessor’s membership, continuity of officers, similarity of collective bargaining provisions, continuity of membership, and continuity of working conditions.

    Back reference.--¶860 .

    Assigning successorship in U.S. v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 10 (DC NJ 1973) 6 EPD ¶8718 , which issued after decision in (DC NJ 1973) 6 EPD ¶8715 , and (DC NJ 1970) 3 EPD ¶8068 .

    See also (DC NY 1987) 44 EPD ¶37,452 , which approved back pay claims in (DC NY 1975) 10 EPD ¶10,437 , 401 FSupp 467; affirmed as modified (CA-2 1976) 11 EPD ¶10,757 , 532 F2d 821; following adjudication of contempt (DC NY 1982) 30 EPD ¶33,198 , (DC NY 1983) 31 EPD ¶33,534 ; affirmed in part (CA-2 1985) 36 EPD ¶34,966 , 753 F2d 1172; affirmed (1986) 40 EPD ¶36,204 , -- US --, 106 SCt 3019.

    Anna M. Stathis, Trial Attorney, James L. Lee, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Regional Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs.

    Edmund P. D’Elia, New York, New York, for Defendants.

    Raff, Administrator: On April 13, 1984, the EEOC brought on an Order to Show Cause why Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association (“Local 28”) and the Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee Essex/Passaic (“JAC E/P”), as the successors in interest to Local 10 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association (“Local 10”) and the Local 10 Joint Apprentice Committee (“Local 10 JAC”), should not be found liable for the alleged conduct of Local 10 and the Local 10 JAC in violating Judge Cohen’s June 5, 1973 order prohibiting Local 10 and its JAC from discriminating against blacks and Puerto Ricans. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 10 et al. [6 EPD ¶8718 ], 6 FEP Cases 1036 (D.N.J. 1973).

    The EEOC contended that Local 28, Local 28 JAC E/P, Local 10 and the JAC of Essex and Passaic counties were involved in activities which violated Judge Cohen’s order and judgment and had engaged in individual and concerted activities calculated to interfere with the EEOC’s ability to determine the nature and extent of defendants’ compliance with the court’s order and judgment. In response, Local 28 and the JAC E/P contested liability for alleged violations of the order and judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that they are not successors to Local 10 or the Local 10 JAC, respectively.

    On August 5, 1985 the EEOC made a Rule 25(c), F.R.Civ.P., motion to have the Local 28 JAC of Northern New Jersey and the Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Education Fund of New Jersey joined with or substituted for the original Local 10 JAC. This motion was granted by order dated February 26, 1987.

    On September 1, 2, and 16, 1987, hearings were held before the Administrator solely on the issue of whether Local 28 is the successor to Local 10. Both parties submitted post trial memoranda and reply memoranda. For the reasons set forth herein, the EEOC’s motion is granted to the extent that Local 28 shall be substituted for and is the successor in interest to Local 10.

    Background

    The history of the “Local 28” litigation is well-known and need not be repeated here. See EEOC v. Local 638, et al. [40 EPD ¶36,204 ], 106 S.Ct. 3019 (1986).

    Local 10 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association and the Local 10 JAC were also involved in litigation concerning discrimination against blacks and hispanics in admission to the union and the apprenticeship program. [1] A trial was held before the late Judge Robert Shaw in the United States District Court in Newark, New Jersey. On December 17, 1970, after hearing the evidence presented at trial, Judge Shaw entered a preliminary injunction against defendants. This injunction enjoined defendants from discriminating against “Negroes or Spanish-Surnamed-Americans,” established a record-keeping system, and ordered hiring and referral procedures. This order was to remain in effect until a final decree was entered. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No. 10 et al, Civ.No. 487-69, 3 EPD ¶8068 (D.N.J., 1970). After entering this preliminary injunction, but before making his final findings, Judge Shaw died and the case was reassigned to Judge Mitchell H.Cohen. On April 2, 1973, Judge Cohen rendered his Opinion and on June 5, 1975, he entered a final order. See [6 EPD ¶8718 ] 6 FEP Cases 1036 (D.N.J. 1973).

    Judge Cohen’s order restrained Local 10 from discriminating against blacks and Puerto Ricans based upon their race or national origin. [2] The order was to remain in effect until 30% of the total sheet metal trade’s journeymen and apprentice members were black and Puerto Rican for a period of one year. The order required that: (1) Local 10 and the JAC establish a special apprenticeship program for over-age blacks and Puerto Ricans; (2) Local 10 not require passing an examination for union membership; (3) Local 10 not require previous work experience under a collective bargaining agreement as a condition precedent for blacks and Puerto Ricans for work referral as a journeyman; (4) Local 10 maintain race identified records; (5) all members of a minority with some experience in the sheet metal trade be eligible for a journeyman referral; (6) “Experience” include, but not be limited to, work as an employee of a union or non-union sheet metal shop, self-employment as a sheet metal contractor, employment as a marine sheet metal worker, employment as a welder, and any related experience acquired in the military service; (7) journeymen permits be given to minority workers where specifically requested by the contractor without consideration of experience or the number of journeymen on the out-of-work list; (8) union membership requirements consist of: (a) one year of experience working for a contractor who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with Local 10; (b) all applicants be charged the standard initiation fee except those minority group members who have sought union membership in the past but did not attain that status, whose payment should be on the same terms afforded to those members of the union who applied at a similar time; and (c) completion of a journeyman examination not be required of minority applicants; (9) after completion of eleven months’ work through the union all minority workers be given the opportunity to apply for Local 10 membership each time they appear at the union hall to renew their permits; (10) the Union have a continuing obligation to ensure that there are sufficient minority workers available for referral as temporary or seasonal help; and (11) within 60 days from entry of the Order the Union file with the Court and the Government a brief description of all work referral and membership procedures, copies of the statements to be made available to all apprentice applicants, to all applicants for journeyman referral and membership, and to all applicants seeking temporary or seasonal work permits.

    As more fully set forth below, by letter dated October 16, 1981, Edward Carlough, General President of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association (“International”), directed that Local 10 be merged into Local 28. On April 25, 1983, Judge Cohen transferred the Local 10 action from the District Court of New Jersey to this Court. Thereafter, defendants moved to have the case transferred back to the New Jersey United States District Court. Defendants’ motion was denied in an order by Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy dated December 29, 1983. Judge Duffy, in the same order, consolidated the Local 10 and Local 28 cases pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). On March 19, 1984, the late Judge Henry Werker directed that I supervise the performance and implementation of the Local 10 case and report on defendants’ pre-merger compliance with Judge Cohen’s order. [3] On April 13, 1984, plaintiff EEOC moved to hold all the named defendants in contempt. On October 17, 1984, Judge Robert L. Carter ordered me to hear and report on the EEOC’s motions.

    The EEOC’s motions of April 13, 1984 and August 5, 1985, raised two central contentions. First, that Local 28 and the Local 28 JAC of Northern New Jersey (and the Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Education Fund of New Jersey) were the successors in interest to Local 10 and the Local 10 JAC, respectively; and, second, that Local 10, Local 10’s JAC, Local 28 and the Local 28 JAC of Northern New Jersey (and its Education Fund) had violated Judge Cohen’s orders. To avoid the possibility of unnecessary discovery, I bifurcated the proceedings and advised the parties that I would determine the successorship issues first. By order dated February 26, 1987, the Local 28 JAC of Northern New Jersey and its Education Fund were substituted for and found to be the successors in interest of the Local 10 JAC. Hearings were then held and evidence taken on whether or not Local 28 is the successor, for liability purposes, to Local 10.

    Findings of Fact

    I. President Carlough’s Merger Order

    By letter dated October 16, 1981 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “1”) (“Pl.Exh. --”), President Carlough of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association ordered the merger of Locals 10, 13, 559 and a portion of Local 22 with Local 28 (“merger order”). [4] President Carlough’s merger order was authorized pursuant to Article 3 Section 2(g) of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Constitution. The merger order provided for a smooth transition. It gave the members in the former locals full credit in Local 28 for years of continuous good standing (Pl.Exh. “1” par.1). In addition, Carlough ordered an audit of the books and records of the former locals. The audit, which was to cover the three months prior to October 1, 1981, was to account for “all income, disbursements, assets, and liabilities” (Pl.Exh. “1” par.2).

    Carlough directed former Local 10 to turn over all funds, books, records and property to the General Secretary-Treasurer of the International Association (Pl.Exh. “1” par.3). The merger order directed that Local 28 assume responsibility for the former local’s collective bargaining agreement that was for a term extending beyond November 1, 1981 (Pl.Exh. “1” par.4). The dues of the members of former Local 10 were to be the dues paid to Local 28 (Pl.Exh. “1” par.5).

    The six business representative positions of the merged locals were maintained. The individuals holding those positions were given the opportunity to remain. William O’Toole, former Local 10 Business Manager, was, in addition to being appointed a business agent of Local 28, appointed as deputy to Local 28 Business Manager Arthur Moore to coordinate all servicing and representation functions for the counties in New Jersey that were transferred to Local 28 (Pl.Exh. “1” par.6). Business representative positions were to be classified by geographical districts for the next general election so that members could be nominated and run as candidates for those districts (Pl.Exh. “1” par.10). The President of former Local 10, Donald Turner, was given the opportunity to become a member of the Local 28 Executive Board (Pl.Exh. “1” par.7).

    One membership meeting each month was to be held in New Jersey to accommodate the members of the merged locals (Pl.Exh. “1” par.9). A dispatching office was to be established in New Jersey for the convenience of the members of the merged locals (Pl.Exh. “1” par. 11 ).

    President Carlough’s authority to impose the type of merger or consolidation at issue here has been upheld by the courts. See Local 37, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, AFL-CIO, 655 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1981); Strong v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association et al., 90 LRRM 2795 (N.D.Ca. 1974). Indeed, two of the local unions encompassed in President Carlough’s October 16, 1981 merger, Locals 22 and 13, challenged the legality of the merger order in the state courts in New Jersey (Pl.Exh. “2” ¶24-26 ). The International removed the case to federal court and on December 9, 1981, Judge Herbert J. Stern issued a Judgment which, among other things, enjoined Local 22 and Local 13 and their former officers from “interfering with or obstructing the implementation of the merger order dated October 16, 1981, issued by Carlough pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution.” Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association and Edward J. Carlough etc., et al. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No. 22 et al., Civ. 81-3415 (D.N.J. Judgment entered December 9, 1981). See also Pl.Exh. “2” ¶14.

    II. The Effect of the Merger

    The effect of the merger order was that Local 28 assumed the responsibilities of governing former Local 10’s membership and administering its collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, although Local 10 ceased to exist, its former members continued to work in the sheet metal industry under the stewardship of a sister local of the same international, and Local 28 assumed its assets and liabilities (Pl.Exh. “2” par. 38; Pl.Exh. “12”). [5]

    A. Continuity of Operations

    As a result of President Carlough’s merger order, Local 28 became the collective bargaining agent of the bargaining unit formerly represented by Local 10. The collective bargaining agreement between Local 10 and New Jersey employers in effect at the time of the merger remained in effect until its expiration on May 31, 1983, well after the merger. Local 28 now administers the collective bargaining agreement for the geographic area formerly covered by Local 10 (Pl.Exh. “2” par. 36, 36(a)). After the merger, the geographic area formerly covered by Local 10 continued to be governed by the Constitution of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association. Additionally, subsequent to the merger, the forty-three employes whose employees were formerly represented by Local 10 continued to employ union members whose bargaining agent is Local 28 (Pl.Exh. “2” par. 49).

    As a result of the transfer of Local 10’s assets and liabilities to Local 28, Local 28 acquired over two hundred twenty-eight thousand dollars ($228,000) in assets (Pl.Exh. “12”). The records and property of Local 10 were also transferred to Local 28 (September 2, 1987, Tr. p.46, lines 22-25; p.48, lines 11-12). [6]

    B. Continuity of Membership

    The membership of Local 10 was transferred to Local 28 (Pl.Exh. “2” pars. 45, 46). Journeymen in Local 10 became journeymen in Local 28 and received full credit for years of continuous good standing. Apprentices in Local 10 became apprentices in Local 28. Prior to the merger, Local 10 had a membership composed of 539 journeymen and approximately 132 apprentices. Defendant’s Response to Memorandum and Order of David Raff dated July 28, 1982. Every one of these journeymen and apprentices was merged into Local 28 with all the rights and privileges they had as Local 10 members.

    C. Continuity of Offices and Jurisdiction

    The former offices of Local 10 at 1500 Broad Street, Bloomfield, New Jersey, became a Local 28 dispatching office (Pl.Exh. “2” pars. 21, 39 and 42). Local 28 now holds meetings open to all members alternately in New York and New Jersey (Pl.Exh. “2” par.44). The merged members continued to work in the same shops and in the same location as they had prior to the merger, although the members could now work in a greatly expanded geographical area.

    D. Continuity of Officers

    After the merger, officials of former Local 10 continued to service exclusively the territorial area of the former local (Pl.Exh. “2” par. 61). Joseph Demark, a Local 10 Business Agent, became a Local 28 Business Agent and performed the same duties in both positions (Demark’s testimony, Sept. 16, 1987 Tr. p.4 lines 24-25; p.5 lines 2, 10-12). William O’Toole, a former Local 10 Business Manager, continued to serve as a Local 28 Business Agent in the same geographical jurisdiction after the merger (Pl.Exh. “1” p.2 par. 6; Pl.Exh. “2” par. 55, O’Toole’s testimony, Sept. 1, 1987 Tr., p.73, lines 18-16). John Bolduc, Executive Director of the Sheet Metal Contractors Association from 1972 to 1987, negotiated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement which was due to be signed June 1, 1981, with Mr. O’Toole. However, the agreement was not signed until mid-December, after the merger. Nonetheless, Mr. Bolduc continued to work with Mr. O’Toole after the merger in an attempt to reach an agreement and Mr. O’Toole is the signatory to that agreement (Pl.Exh. “9”). Indeed, Mr. Bolduc continued to have a working relationship with Mr. O’Toole and Mr. Demark for approximately one year after the merger (Bolduc’s testimony, Sept. 1, 1987, Tr. p.44, lines 3-25; pp.46-47, lines 17-25, 1-16). Finally, Donald Turner, the former Local 10 President, received salary and expenses from Local 28 in 1981 (Pl.Exh. “2” par. 59, Pl.Exh. “12”).

    E. Continuity of Terms of Employment

    Former Local 10 members continued to work in the sheet metal trade governed by the collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the time of the merger. Therefore, subsequent to the merger, former Local 10 members continued to work under the same rules concerning wages, benefits, discipline, and working conditions. See Carlough affidavit dated November 4, 1981 at pp. 8-9.

    F. Notice of the Order and Judgment against Local 10

    Local 28 has made a major issue out of its contention that it had no notice of Judge Cohen’s order at the time of the merger and that it would be denied due process if it were now to be held accountable for Local 10’s conduct under the order. However, this issue is obviated by the fact that President Carlough had the authority to transfer Local 10’s liabilities to Local 28 (as well as its assets), that Carlough did transfer the liabilities, and that Local 28 admitted it has assumed Local 10’s liabilities. Moreover, since Local 10 was enfolded in Local 28 as a result of a consolidation or merger, and not by a purchase of assets, Local 28 was required to assume Local 10’s liabilities by operation of law. Notwithstanding these findings, and assuming that notice is still an issue, I find that Local 28 had adequate notice.

    The order and judgment against Local 10 was common knowledge and it was publicized in the media (Sept. 1, 1987 Tr. p. 68 lines 2-14). In the original 1975 post trial memorandum plaintiffs filed and served upon Sol Bogen, Local 28’s General Counsel between 1972 and 1977, the Local 10 case is referred to on four separate occasions (Pl.Exh. “10” at pp. 153, 159, 171 and 181). In light of Local 28’s long history in the courts and the fact that a neighboring sister local was in the federal courts at the same time on an identical issue, i.e. discrimination against blacks and hispanics, I reject Local 28’s witnesses’ testimony that no one in Local 28 knew about the Local 10 judgment, before the merger. I find such testimony to be incredible and self-serving. I thus find that Local 28 did know about the Local 28 order and judgment while the merger was under consideration.

    Even if Local 28 did not have actual knowledge of the Local 10 order, it had constructive knowledge or should be held responsible for failure to make proper inquiry about Local 10’s liabilities. O’Toole, Smith and Demark, all former Local 10 officials with knowledge of the Local 10 order, became Business Agents of Local 28 (Sept. 1, 1987 Tr. 62, lines 6-14 [O’Toole]; Sept. 2, 1987 Tr. p. 9, lines 5-14 [Smith]; Sept. 16, 1987 Tr. p. 7, lines 4-10 [Demark]). Frances Pykon, former Local 10’s counsel and the counsel of record for defendants in the Local 10 case, was receiving legal fees from Local 28 as late as 1983. See Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association Local Union #28 Financial Report dated December 31, 1983. Even if Local 28 had no independent knowledge of the Local 10 order, Local 28 had a duty to inquire about the totality of the effects of the merger. The Recording Secretary and President of Local 28 were aware of the real possibility of a merger well before the actual merger order from Carlough was issued (Sept. 2, 1987, Tr., Casey, pp. 61-62; Moore p. 90, lines 2-17). This is corroborated by Carlough’s November 4, 1981 affidavit in the Local 22 case, where he states that the mergers of Locals 10, 13, 22 and 559 were known and, in fact, “discussed by [him] with business representatives of the local unions affected at the recent business agents’ meeting in Hawaii in August of 1981.” Id at 5. See also Carlough affidavit dated May 9, 1984, at ¶13 submitted in opposition to the EEOC’s contempt motion in the present proceeding. Thus Local 28 had time to inquire about any liabilities that Local 10 may have had. It appears, however, that Local 28’s officials relied solely upon their review of the fiscal conditions of Local 10 and never asked about either pending litigation or outstanding orders. Local 28 is no stranger to the court system. Like many construction unions, it has matters before the NLRB, it has jurisdictional disputes, problems with collection of benefits from employers and other matters where legal liability may arise, to say nothing of the discrimination actions. It is beyond the pale to believe that no one thought to ask O’Toole or Pykon if Local 10 was involved in any legal proceedings. If no such inquiry was made, it clearly should have been.

    G. Local 10 Can No Longer Provide Relief

    Subsequent to the merger, Local 10 ceased to exist as a legal entity. All of its assets and liabilities were transferred to Local 28. Thus, Local 10 could not provide the relief ordered by Judge Cohen after the merger nor could Local 10 provide relief if it is determined that Judge Cohen’s order had been violated. However, Local 28 does have the assets to remedy any violation of Judge Cohen’s order. Indeed, Local 28 obtained some $228,000 in assets from former Local 10, as well as the dues that Local 10 members once paid into Local 10’s coffers.

    Discussion

    The EEOC contends that Local 28 is the successor in interest of former Local 10 and, as such, may be required to remedy any violations of Judge Mitchell H. Cohen’s order and judgment. Local 28 raises a number of defenses, but the primary ones are that: 1) prior to the merger it had neither actual nor constructive notice of Judge Cohen’s order against Local 10; 2) there is no substantial continuity of business operations between the predecessor and successor entity; 3) since the merger was involuntary it would be unfair to impose a successor liability upon Local 28; and 4) a finding of successor liability would impose an unfair financial hardship upon Local 28.

    Although the principles of successor liability are well established under both labor relations and anti-discrimination laws, this case appears to be one of first impression. The parties have not brought to my attention, and in my own research I have not found, any cases where the successorship issue involved a labor union and Title VII. As a consequence, I will spell out, in detail, how the factors to be considered in determining successor liability apply to the case at hand.

    Factors to Be Considered

    The concept of successor liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq (“Title VII”) evolved from a line of cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act (“Labor Act”), 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. Under both acts, the courts have found that the determination of successorship liability is fact specific to the case at hand. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing v. NLRB [106 LC ¶12,333 ], 107 S.Ct. 2225 (1987) (Labor Act); Musikawamba v. Essi [35 EPD ¶35,149], 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985) (§1981 action) (“Musikawamba”); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Association [35 EPD ¶34,703 ], 744 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (Title VII); Howard Johnson v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Union [74 LC ¶10,066 ], 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (Labor Act); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers [8 EPD ¶9727 ], 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974) (Title VII); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB [72 LC ¶14,124 ], 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (Labor Act); National Labor Relations Board v. Burns International Security Services [68 LC ¶12,660 ], 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (Labor Act); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston [49 LC ¶18,846 ], 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (Labor Act). However, the courts have established some general principles which should guide the determination.

    In this case, where imposition of successorship liability is sought against a union rather than a corporation, the union argues that the general principles for a determination of successorship which have been applied to corporations are not applicable to unions. This argument is without merit.

    Where imposition of successorship liability is sought against a union rather than a corporation, the underlying concepts and public policy considerations retain their validity although they must be stated in slightly different terms. The factors for determining successor liability for a union may be summarized as follows: 1) whether the successor union had notice of the liability; 2) the ability of the predecessor union to provide relief; 3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of the union’s operations; 4) whether the successor union uses the same offices or encompasses the same jurisdiction; 5) whether the successor union has absorbed the predecessor’s membership; 6) whether the officers of the predecessor union continued in some official capacity in the successor union; 7) whether the wages, terms and conditions of employment administered by the predecessor, as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, are the same or substantially equivalent to those administered by the successor; 8) whether the members continue to pay dues and enjoy the same membership rights; and 9) whether the members continue to work at the same trade for the same or similar employees. Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers [8 EPD ¶9727 ], 503 F.2d at 1094 (“MacMillan”). It is not necessary, however, that each and every factor be met to find successor liability, nor is one factor controlling. Musikawamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d at 751; Kolosky v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 585 F.Supp. 746, 749 (W.D.Pa. 1983). The ultimate issue that must be addressed by the application of these factors, in this case, is whether a forced merger can serve to extinguish the rights of victims of discrimination or members of the protected classes where a court has found a predecessor union liable for violations of Title VII.

    In considering the successorship factors listed above, I have applied the following concepts: First, the merger doctrine applies and not the “purchase of assets” analysis; thus, those cases cited by Local 28 which discuss the notice requirement in purchase of asset cases are inapposite to this case. Second, the notice requirement can be met by actual notice, constructive notice or implied notice, or be inferred by operation of law; and third, the order against Local 10 is a liability which can attach to a nonparty successor. [7]

    Application of the Merger Analysis

    Pursuant to his authority under the International’s Constitution and Ritual, Article 3 Section 2(g), General President Carlough ordered the merger of Local 10 into Local 28. Regardless of whether such a merger was involuntary on Local 28’s part, or whether or not Local 28 considered it unfair, Carlough had the power to impose the merger and assign both the assets and liabilities of Local 10 to Local 28. The exercise of Carlough’s authority is not unique to the October 16, 1981 merger. Indeed, Carlough has ordered similar mergers on a number of occasions. See Carlough affidavit, dated May 9, 1984. His actions have even been challenged in the courts, and his power has uniformly been upheld. See discussion of the Local 37, Strong and Local 22 cases, supra, at 11.

    In the case of the Local 10 merger, the International transferred all of Local 10’s liabilities to Local 28 and, in fact, Local 28 assumed those liabilities. To the extent that it may later be determined that former Local 10 violated Judge Cohen’s order, and there are monetary damages awarded, Local 28’s complaint is with the International for forcing it to assume Local 10’s liabilities. The victims, or class members, protected by the Local 10 order cannot have their rights extinguished by the International’s conduct in dissolving Local 10, especially where, as here, Local 28 can remedy any wrongs that Local 10 may have committed by virtue of its alleged contemptuous conduct. It would clearly be against public policy to relieve Local 28 of any responsibility while it reaps the benefits of the merger, including $228,000 in assets and the dues of the former Local 10 members. Under these circumstances, actual notice of the Local 10 order was not necessary.

    The same result would obtain under the general principles of a merger, since under the law applicable to mergers liability is assumed by the successor entity. Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co. [30 EPD ¶33,170 ], 694 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1982); (an exception to the general rule of nonliability exists where there is an express or implied agreement of assumption or where the transaction amounts to a merger); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1977).

    Local 28 relies heavily upon “purchase of assets” cases to argue that it had no notice or that it would be unfair to find successorship. These cases simply do not apply. However, even if “purchase of asset” cases did apply, actual notice is not required in every instance. See Slack v. Havens [10 EPD ¶10,343 ], 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); Kolosky v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 585 F.Supp. at 749.

    While, in general, a corporation which merely purchases the assets of another corporation does not assume its predecessor’s liability, e.g., Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), [8] there is an exception to this rule where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and seller. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 551; Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc. [41 EPD ¶36,507 ], 794 F.2d 1228, 1236 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1986); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp. 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3rd Cir. 1974).

    In Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 182-3 n. 5, the Supreme Court recognized that ordinarily it is not necessary to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets where there is a continuity in the “employing industry.” The rationale for this principle is that the public policies underlying the labor law successorship doctrine are best served by its broad application. Id. However, the Supreme Court found in Howard Johnson v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. at 257 that the distinctions between merger, consolidation and purchase of assets are relevant where: 1) there is a background of state law that embodies the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation; and 2) unless relief is afforded against the successor there would be no way of enforcing the obligations of the predecessor entity.

    Since in this case, there is state law requiring merging corporations to assume the liabilities of the merged corporation, and there is no means of remedying violations of Judge Cohen’s order against Local 10, the distinction between a merger and a purchase of assets is relevant. Although the merger was imposed, rather than voluntary, the situation is nonetheless governed by the policy considerations requiring merging corporations to assume the liabilities of the merged entity. Therefore, Local 28 may be held liable for violations of Judge Cohen’s order even without a finding of continuity of operations or actual notice.

    Local 1, Broadcast Employees v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 461 F.Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded [87 LC ¶11,782 ], 614 F.2d 846 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff’d., 598 F.Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (“Local 1”) involved facts similar to those in this case. The International imposed a merger upon two locals, Local 1 and Local 107. Prior to the merger, Local 1 had passed a resolution which provided that Local 1 would pay its business manager a salary if and when it was financially possible. Id at 464. After the merger, the business manager attempted to collect his salary from Local 107.

    The merger of Local 10 and Local 28 was also imposed by an international. The liability in this case is of the same contingent nature as the liability in the Local 1 case. Local 28 would be liable for Local 10’s violations of the court order “if and when” such violations are proven in contempt proceedings. [9]

    The Local 1 court held Local 107, the merging union, liable for the salary payments to which Local 1 had agreed. The court reached its decision by applying the state law of corporate mergers to the merger between the two unions:

    While this legal conclusion seems patent, express authority therefor is found in 15 Purdons §1907. We determine that the Pennsylvania courts, whose law we follow, would apply this statute to a case like ours involving unincorporated associations, since there is no Pennsylvania statute on the merger of unincorporated associations and since the policies that find expression in 15 Pardons §1907 are so fundamental.

    Id. at 983.

    The Pennsylvania corporations law provides that the new corporation shall be responsible for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the merged corporations. Section 906(b)(3) of the New York Business Corporation Law is framed in similar terms:

    The surviving or consolidated corporation shall assume and be liable for all the liabilities, obligations and penalties of each of the constituent corporations. No liability due or obligation or to become due, claim or demand for any cause existing against any such corporation . . . shall be released or impaired by such merger or consolidation. . . . No action or proceeding . . . shall abate or be discontinued by such merger or consolidation, but may be enforced, prosecuted, settled or compromised as if such merger or consolidation had not occurred, or such surviving or consolidated corporation may be substituted in such action or special proceeding in place of any constituent corporation.

    New York Business Corporation Law §906(b)(3) (McKinney 1963); cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. §14A:10-b (West 1969).) See Hocke Productions v. Jayark Films, 256 F.Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying §906 to a de facto merger of two corporations).

    As in Pennsylvania, there is no New York or New Jersey law relating to the merger of unions or other unincorporated associations.

    In this case, it is not contract rights which are involved but rights arising from a court-imposed judgment. The Local 1 court held that “fundamental policies” prevented the union from extinguishing contract liability by means of a merger, which is a legal device corporations often employ. Local 1, 461 F.Supp. 1983. These same fundamental policies should play an even more important role in this case to prevent the union from extinguishing judgment liability by means of the same legal device.

    Noting the structural similarities between corporations and unions, the courts have applied many of the legal obligations imposed upon corporations to unions. In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922), the Supreme Court held that unions may be sued in federal court and noted that “no organized corporation has greater unity of action, and in none is more power centered in the governing executive bodies.” In Highway & City Freight Drivers v. Gordon Transports, 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978), which involved a labor union’s petition for voluntary bankruptcy, the court held that a union was a person for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act by applying the Act’s definition of a corporation to the union. The court based its decision upon the fact that unions have the power and privileges not held by individuals or partnerships. Id. at 1289. See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (a union’s existence is as perpetual as a corporation); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 (1962) (a union, like a corporation, is the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it) (quoting Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470 (1960)); Oil Workers International Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.App.2d 512 (1951). (“The labor union is a developing institution and with its tremendous growth in importance and power has come to be more akin to the corporation than the partnership or the social or fraternal order.”)

    Application of the Successorship Doctrine

    Even if Local 28 were not liable for violations of Judge Cohen’s order by operation of law, there is sufficient continuity of operations to impose successorship liability.

    When a court applies the successorship doctrine, it must balance the interest in freely transferring the business against the public interest in eliminating unfair labor or employment practices. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston [49 LC ¶18,846 ], 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964); Musikawamba v. Essi, 760 F.2d at 745. To hold a successor liable for a judgment against its predecessor may seem unduly harsh upon the successor who did not participate in any discriminatory acts. Yet the courts have held that where there is substantial employer continuity, the right of a victim of discrimination to a remedy outweighs these considerations: “[T]he court is of the considered opinion that when an aggrieved party has brought charges against a named respondent before the EEOC . . . he should be allowed to pursue his alleged claims for relief against the party defendant even though his course may lead him through that dark and dismal forest known to all as the corporate reshuffle.” Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co. [3 EPD ¶8008 ], 50 F.R.D. 494, 497 (E.D.N.C. 1970). Accord Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 494 U.S. at 181. Thus, Local 28’s successor liability stems not from any discriminatory practices in which it actually participated, but rather from the fact that it is Local 10’s successor in interest. See Bates v. Pacific Maritime Association, 744 F.2d at 709. “It is to be emphasized that the equities of the matter favor successor liability because it is the successor who has benefited from the discriminatory employment practices of its predecessor.” EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel, 503 F.2d at 1092.

    In EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel, 503 F.2d at 1094, the Sixth Circuit set forth factors to be considered in determining whether there has been sufficient continuity to justify imposition of successor liability: 1) whether the successor had notice of the liability prior to acquiring the assets of the predecessor; 2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief; 3) whether there has been substantial continuity in business operations; 4) whether the new employer uses the same plant; 5) whether it uses the same or substantially the same workforce; 6) whether it uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel; 7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the same working conditions; 8) whether it uses the same machinery, equipment, and methods of production; and 9) whether he produces the same product. As discussed above at 21, these factors may be expressed in terms which are tied closely to the characteristics of a labor organization. These considerations, as relevant to a labor organization, have been applied to the facts of this case.

    1. Whether the Successor Union Had Notice of the Liability

    The notice issue has been gone into at great length, above, and will not be repeated in detail here. In summary: a) the notice requirement is obviated by the fact that Local 28 was required to assume Local 10’s liabilities by Carlough, and they did so; b) because the transfer of assets and liabilities between Local 10 and Local 28 was a merger, and not a purchase of assets, the exception to the requirement of actual notice applies both by operation of law and by public policy; c) I have found, as fact, that Local 28 knew about the Local 10 order and judgment prior to the merger; d) even if the present officers of Local 28 did not have actual knowledge, Local 28 had the duty to find out from the predecessor all outstanding potential and actual liabilities, cf. Musikawamba v. Essi, 760 F.2d at 752; [10] e) the key officers of Local 10 not only assumed official status in Local 28, William O’Toole, Local 10’s former Business Manager continued to bargain for a contract that covered Local 10’s former geographical area after the merger. Under these circumstances Local 28 should be charged with constructive knowledge. Cf. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp. [25 EPD ¶31,529 ], 507 F.Supp. 599 at 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

    In its defense, Local 28 notes that in NLRB v. Local 46, Metallic Lathers [100 LC ¶10,790 ], 727 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Local 46”), the Second Circuit held that a union was not liable for its predecessor’s unfair labor practices because the union did not have notice of the charges pending against its successor. The court’s decision, however, was not based upon the successorship doctrine but on common law principles of agency. In the Local 46 case, the Court of Appeals upheld the administrative law judge’s ruling against the International with which Local 46 was affiliated. When the International later affiliated with the Carpenters, the NLRB petitioned the court to enforce liability against the Carpenters. The court denied the NLRB’s petition partly because the Board had misapplied the common law agency principles of imputed knowledge. Local 46 727 F.2d at 237.

    The facts in Local 46 were entirely different from those in this case. Local 46 involved an affiliation between two separate construction trades operating under two separate constitutions, while this case involves a merger between two sister locals of the same International, operating under the same constitution. In Local 46, representatives of the International and the Carpenters signed an affiliation agreement which created a Lathing Subdivision of the Carpenters. There was no commingling of funds between the Lathers and the Carpenters. See 259 NLRB No. 10 at p. 71 (1981). Moreover, the Carpenters were not required to assume the liabilities of Local 46 as part of the affiliation agreement. Consequently, there was no reason to apply the successorship doctrine to the Carpenters. Local 46 remained intact and in control of its own operations. It was capable of remedying its own discriminatory practices. Local 10, however, has dissolved; Local 28 alone has control of remedying any discriminatory practices. If Local 28 is not held responsible, then any unfair employment practices or, indeed, contempt of court, will go unremedied.

    2. The Ability of the Predecessor Union to Provide Relief

    In Musikawamba v. Essi, 760 F.2d at 750, the Seventh Circuit stated that: “One of the underlying reasons for the successor doctrine is that an employee’s statutory rights should not be vitiated by the mere fact of a sudden change in the employer’s business. That employee should be able to enforce against a successor a claim or judgment that he could have succesfully enforced against a predecessor.” (Emphasis added) However, the court noted that one should look, in the first instance, to see whether or not the predecessor was capable of providing relief.

    In this case there is no doubt that the predecessor cannot provide any relief, since it has ceased to exist. This is a compelling factor in finding Local 28 the successor for Local 10. See Bates v. Pacific Maritime Association, 744 F.2d at 710. (The successor was liable for a consent decree entered in a Title VII action against its predecessor, even though the predecessor remained in existence, in order to ensure that plaintiffs obtained the full relief provided for in the consent decree.)

    3. Whether There Has Been a Substantial Continuity of the Union’s Operations

    Continuity of operations is one of the factors the MacMillan court considered in imposing successor liability. MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. See also Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB, 107 S.Ct. at 2236; Bates v. Pacific Maritime, 744 F.2d at 709; Golden State Bottling v. NLRB [72 LC ¶14,124 ], 414 U.S. at 184. In this case, there has been substantial continuity of operations. Local 28 assumed all of Local 10’s collective bargaining agreements, its membership, and its assets and liabilities. Local 10’s former officials serviced the former Local 10 members. What changes there were, were more in form than in substance. The union was larger, the main office was now in New York City, and leadership was assumed by the President of Local 28. However, none of these changes were extraordinary or outside of what normally happens in a merger situation, especially since this all took place under the International’s Constitution, which governed both Local 10 and Local 28.

    4. Whether the Successor Union Uses the Same Offices or Encompasses the Same Jurisdiction

    The MacMillan court formulated this concern in terms of whether the new corporate employer used the same plant. MacMillan 503 F.2d at 1094. In this case there has been substantial continuity of physical location. Local 10’s office was simply transformed into a Local 28 branch office; Local 28 was directed to have one membership meeting each month in New Jersey, for the convenience of former Local 10 members; and Local 28 currently administers the jurisdiction which was formerly Local 10’s.

    Local 28 argues that it does not encompass the same geographical jurisdiction as Local 10, but rather a very much expanded jurisdiction which includes all of Northern New Jersey, New York City and Long Island. Local 28 goes on to argue that it has different chief executive officers and a substantially enlarged membership. These factors are not dispositive. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing v. NLRB [106 LC ¶12,133], 107 S.Ct. 2225 (1987). Indeed, the nature of a merger is such that the sum is normally greater than its parts. The fact that Local 28 is larger, stronger and covers a greater geographical area certainly does not mean that those who were protected by Judge Cohen’s order should now be stripped of the benefits that should have flowed from that court order. To the contrary, it is essential to the public policy behind Title VII that those rights be preserved.

    5. Whether the Successor Has Absorbed the Predecessor’s Membership

    Within the context of corporate employers, this consideration has been framed in terms of whether there has been continuity of workforce. See, e.g., MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. Clearly Local 28’s membership now includes former Local 10 apprentices and journeymen. Prior to the merger, Local 10 had a membership consisting of 539 journeymen and 132 apprentices. Subsequent to the merger, all of these Local 10 members became members of Local 28. Therefore, not only was there substantial continuity of workforce, there was complete continuity.

    Local 28 argues that since its membership increased as a result of the merger, there has not been continuity in membership. The court in NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph. [102 LC ¶11,328 ], 752 F.2d 459, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1985) addressed precisely this issue. “Successorship law does not focus on whether the new employer has become a bigger and better business. Instead, the law focuses on whether business operations, ‘as they impinge on union membership, remain essentially the same after the transfer of ownership.’ ” Quoting Hudson River Aggregates, 639 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1981). The issue is not whether the new workforce is larger than the old one. The issue is whether a substantial number of the old workforce was transferred to the successor. In this case, the entire union membership of Local 10 was transferred to Local 28.

    6. Whether the Officers of the Predecessor Union Continued in Some Official Capacity in the Successor Union

    In the corporate context, this aspect of continuity is often expressed in terms of whether the merging entity employed the same supervisor personnel. See, e.g., MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. President Carlough’s merger order clearly intended to ensure substantial continuity of management. The order created six full-time business representatives of Local 10 and the other locals involved in the merger were to fill these positions. William O’Toole, Local 10’s former Business Manager, was appointed a Local 28’s business agent “to coordinate all servicing and representation functions for those counties in the State of New Jersey being transferred to Local 10, Donald Turner, was to assume a position on Local 28’s Executive Board. Local 28’s 1983 financial statement indicates that Local 28 paid compensation to Local 10’s former attorney, Frances H. Pykon, and to its former president, Donald Turner. Thus, there was substantial continuity of union supervisory personnel. Since after the merger, union members continued to work in shops where they had been previously employed, there was also substantial continuity of supervisory personnel at their places of employment.

    7. Whether the Wages, Terms and Conditions of Employment Administered by the Predecessor, as Set Forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Are the Same As or Substantially Similar to Those Administered by the Successor

    In terms of the MacMillan factors, this consideration has been stated as follows: whether the same jobs exist under substantially the same working conditions, and whether the successor uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of production. MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. Since Local 28 assumed all of Local 10’s obligations under the collective bargaining agreements in effect at the time of the merger, and Local 10 members continued to work for the same employers, in the same shops, performing the same duties, there was substantial continuity of terms and conditions of employment.

    8. Whether the Members Continue to Pay Dues and Enjoy the Same Membership Rights

    A further indicia of continuity is the fact that former Local 10 members continued to pay dues, although these dues were payable to Local 28 rather than Local 10. The merger order also required Local 28 to accord former Local 10 members the benefits of their years of continuous good standing, i.e. membership rights.

    9. Whether the Members Continue to Work at the Same Trade for the Same or Similar Employers

    Local 10 members continued to do sheet metal work in the shops where they had been previously employed. From the members’ point of view, the merger did not significantly affect their employment situations.

    In Fall River Dying and Finishing v. NLRB [106 LC ¶12,333 ], 107 S.Ct. 2225 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a corporation which resumed the production of a predecessor, which had ceased operations for a period of seven months, was a successor for purposes of the Labor Management Relations Act. In that case the successor did not continue the operations of its predecessor. It engaged in only the commission dyeing aspect of its predecessor’s business; it did not engage in converting dyeing, which had constituted 60-70% of the predecessor’s business. The predecessor was completely shutdown for a period of seven months. The successor’s employees were hired through newspaper advertisements rather than the predecessor’s employment records. The successor bought some of the predecessor’s inventory on the open market; it did not buy the predecessor’s trade name, good will or assume any of its liabilities.

    Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held the new corporation to be a successor based upon the following facts: 1) it acquired most of the predecessor’s real property, machinery, equipment, inventory, and materials; 2) it introduced no new product line; 3) the production process remained the same; and 4) the employees worked on the same machines, in the same building, with the same job classifications under virtually the same supervisors.

    In this case, there was no seven month hiatus in operations. Local 28 acquired all of Local 10’s property, and the union members continued to work under the same conditions as they had prior to the merger as described in the preceding sections of this opinion.

    Conclusion

    Judge Cohen entered a comprehensive affirmative action program in the Local 10 case. As in the Local 28 case, the program was designed to open the door to blacks and hispanics who had historically been excluded from the sheet metal trade. The EEOC has contended that Local 10 has violated Judge Cohen’s order and that it has been thwarted in its efforts to obtain those records necessary to fully monitor compliance. If Local 10 has violated the order entered by Judge Cohen, the class sought to be protected, and certainly any identified victims, have a right to be made whole. However, as a result of the action taken by the International, Local 10 has ceased to exist. If I were to accept Local 28’s argument that it is not the successor to Local 10, the victims of Local 10’s alleged conduct would be subjected to the extinguishment of substantial rights. Moreover, it would mean that the International could take the same action in the Local 28 case and thus extinguish the rights of those protected by the Local 28 Order and Judgment. Such a course of action would undermine Title VII and afford any union in a similar situation an easy out. All they would need do is be merged into an “innocent” local, claim the merger was forced upon them, and contend that they had no notice.

    It is regrettable that Local 28, with its long litigation history and its own substantial financial liability, would be compelled to assume the financial liability that may flow if contempt is found in the Local 10 case. Nonetheless, on balance, it would be more regrettable if the victims of Local 10’s alleged contemptuous conduct were bereft of a remedy while Local 28 kept the assets that flowed from the merger. To the extent that liability, if any, is found, it may well be possible to fashion relief in a way that will not impede the union in carrying out its day to day activities. However, the spectre of financial distress is not a basis for absolutely denying successor liability.

    Throughout, Local 28 argued that it has been, or will be if found to be a successor, denied due process. Local 28 has received, and will receive, all the due process it is entitled to. It has been given a full and fair hearing on the issue of its successor liability. It will be given a full and fair opportunity to defend itself against the EEOC’s contempt motion. This is all the due process that is required under the well established case law on successor liability.

    The EEOC’s motion is granted to the extent that Local 28 shall be substituted for, and is hereby determined to be the successor in interest of, Local 10.

    [QR]SO ORDERED

    [The chart contained in footnote 3 is reproduced below.--CCH.]

                                                   Membership Non White Percentage
    
    Journeymen ................................... 539 26 4.7%
    Apprentices .................................. 132 38 28.8%
    ---------- --------- ----------
    TOTAL ................................. 671 64 9.5%

    Footnotes

    1

    Local 10’s jurisdiction encompassed Essex and Passaic counties in New Jersey.

    2

    Judge Cohen’s order also applied to Local 10’s JAC, which was composed of members from the Sheet Metal Contractors’ Association of Essex and Passaic counties and Local 10. The order required the JAC to take the following measures to eliminate the effects of past discrimination: (1) conferment of advanced standing to minority applicants with experience in the sheet metal trade; (2) maintenance of race identified records; (3) offers of indenture as apprentices to two individuals who had been discriminated against in 1967, at the rate of pay they would have achieved at the time of the court’s order but for the JAC’s discriminatory treatment; (4) applicants for the JAC be considered qualified if they are 18 to 23 years old (with two years’ credit for time in military service), have 10th Grade or Grade Equivalency diplomas, and a passing score on the “General Aptitude Test Battery” administered by the New Jersey State Employment Service; (6) establishment of a special apprenticeship program for over-age blacks and Puerto Ricans who are otherwise qualified; (7) recruitment of minority applicants for all apprenticeship programs based upon participation requirements of 3 minority applicants indentured for every 5 applicants accepted, a minimum of 21 minority members indentured for every twelve-month period; and (8) the JAC’s interview be used to rank but not to disqualify apprentice applicants.

    3

    The court’s concern with Local 10’s pre merger compliance was generated by that fact that at the time of trial, in 1970, Local 10 had approximately 600 journeymen, all of whom were white, 6 FEP Cases at 1039 (¶3), and about 120 apprentices, 3 to 4 of whom were black. Id at 1040 (¶¶10 & 15) Notwithstanding Judge Shaw’s 1970 preliminary injunction and Judge Cohen’s 1973 order requiring, inter alia, that the Local 10 JAC indenture “a minimum of 21 minority members . . . for every twelve month period following the entry of the Order,” 6 FEP Cases 1044 (¶4.6.), and that “3 minority applicants shall be indentured for every 5 applicants accepted,” id at ¶4.a., as of June 1982 the total black and hispanic journeyman and apprentice membership accounted for only 9.5% of the total membership, broken down as follows:

    [The chart contained in footnote 3 is reproduced at the end of this case.--CCH.]

    In a report I made to Judge Werker on January 6, 1983, I noted that even if one were to assume an extrordinarily high non white attrition rate of 40%, if Judge Cohen’s order had been followed there should have been at least 113 non whites in Local 10 and its JAC by June 1982. While there may be innocent reasons for this significant difference, it is also possible that at least the quota aspects of Judge Cohen’s order were not being complied with. This concern came, of course, right after Local 28 and the Local 28 JAC had twice been found guilty of contempt, and part of that finding was based upon Local 28 JAC’s under utilization of its apprentice program.

    4

    Local 559 is a production rather than construction shop and need not be discussed further. Local 22 is now independent and has decertified from the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association and so is also not relevant to this discussion. For a discussion of Local 28’s status as the successor to Local 13, see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the N.L.R.B. supplemental decision in Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local 13, and Local 28 v. Paul Mirable, Case No. 22-CB-4378 (Pl.Exh. “11”).

    5

    In a parallel situation involving Local 13, which was merged into Local 28 at the same time and under the same conditions as Local 10, the National Labor Relations Board found Local 28 to be the successor of Local 13 for the purposes of remedying unfair labor practices. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local 13, and Local 28 v. Paul Mirable, (Pl.Exh. “11”).

    Although the NLRB decision involved a different predecessor local, the successor liability issue was the same, Local 28 had the opportunity to contest successorship, the conditions under which Carlough ordered the Local 13 merger were identical to the Local 10 merger, and Local 28’s primary argument was lack of notice. Moreover, Local 28 did not file any exceptions to the NLRB’s Administrative Law Judge’s finding, paid the back pay due Paul Mirable and undertook the required notice posting, in its own name. Under these circumstances, the court could simply find Local 28 to be the successor to Local 10 based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See, e.g. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966). However, because there is some question in my mind about Local 28’s incentive to vigorously contest the successorship liability matter before the NLRB, since it involved only one back pay claim, I will not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However, I will accept the NLRB order, and Local 28’s compliance, as evidence in the present matter.

    6

    In an affidavit submitted to Judge Stern in the Local 22 merger contest, Carlough noted that “the only effect of the merger on the members of former Local Unions 10, 13, and 22 is a transfer of membership into different local unions.” (Emphasis in original.) Carlough affidavit, dated November 4, 1981, at p. 9.

    7

    A judgment is a form of liability which may be binding upon a successor. See, e.g., Regal Knitwear v. NLRB [9 LC ¶51,193 ], 324 U.S. 9, 14 et seq. (1945) (NLRB cease-and-desist order is binding against successor); Walling v. James V. Reuter, 321 U.S. 671 (1944) (injunction enforcible against successor to a family business which had been dissolved while litigation was still pending); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Association, 744 F.2d at 705 (consent judgement entered in Title VII class action held to be binding against successor); Cf. Expert Electric Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977) (association members were bound by a judgment against the association where the association had standing to assert their interests, and the association adequately protected their interests); Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857, (3d Cir. 1972) (an assignee of the original party was bound by a prior decision); First Congregational Church and Society of Burlington, Iowa v. Evangelical and Reformed Church, 305 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 918 (1963) (a prior judgment against church bodies was binding upon church members, congregations, and members.)

    8

    However, even in those cases where there has been a purchase of assets rather than a merger, successorship liability may be imposed upon a finding of continuity in operations. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB [74 LC ¶10,066 ], 414 U.S. at 182-3 n.5 (1973); MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. See also NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, [90 LC ¶12,626 ], 639 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1981).

    9

    Under certain circumstances, a successor can be held liable for the unknown and contingent liabilities of the predecessor. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, 762 F.2d 303, 309-312 (3rd Cir. 1984).

    10

    In this regard, the record shows that Local 28 relied solely upon an accountant’s financial statements and made no inquiry about pending litigation or outstanding orders even though they had a reasonable basis to believe in, at least, August of 1981, that a merger was likely.

    © 2026 CCH Incorporated and its affiliates and licensors. All rights reserved.

    • Manage Cookie Preferences
    • Privacy Statement
    • Terms of Use