Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 39 EPD ¶36,068, Nelle G. Peebles, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Sammie Lynn Puett et al., Defendants-Appellees., (Oct. 04, 1985), (Oct 4, 1985)
Nelle G. Peebles, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Sammie Lynn Puett et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section at Nashville. Case No. 85-149-II, October 4, 1985
On Appeal from Chancery Court of Maury County. Affirmed.
Tennessee--FEP Law
Handicap Discrimination--Manic Depression--Basis of Rejection--Comparative Qualifications. --A public agency’s failure to select an applicant who had previously suffered from manic depression for the position of junior eligibility counselor was justified since it was based on grounds other than her mental handicap. Her extreme emotional reaction to the interviewer’s statement that her knowledge of the applicant’s previous manic depression might be considered in the selection decision indicated that the applicant might be unable to remain under control when, as a junior eligibility counselor she might have to interview prospective recipients of assistance who might refer to her previous difficulties. Also, the two individuals selected for the position had much better qualifications for the job.
Back reference.--Tennessee ¶27,899.40.
J. Houston Gordon, Michael W. Whitaker (Gordon, Forrester & Whitaker), Covington, Tennessee, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
W.J. Michael Cody, Attorney General and Reporter, Robert Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before Todd, P.J., Lewis and Cantrell, JJ.
Todd, J.: The plaintiff has appealed from a non-jury judgment dismissing her suit to enforce her rights under TCA §8-50-103, 104 and §4-21-124, which provide as follows:
8-50-103. Employment of the handicapped--Discrimination prohibited--Penalty--Complaint.--(a) There shall be no discrimination in the hiring practices of the state of Tennessee or any department, agency, institution, or political subdivision of the state, or of any private employer against any applicant for employment based solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap of the applicant, unless such handicap to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the duties required by the employment sought or impairs the performance of the work involved. Furthermore, no blind person shall be discriminated against in any such hiring practices because such person uses a guide dog. Violation of this provision is a misdemeanor, punishable as provided by law for misdemeanors generally.
(b) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory practice prohibited by this section may file with the Tennessee human development commission a written sworn complaint stating that a discriminatory practice has been committed, setting forth the facts sufficient to enable the commission to identify the persons charged. Upon receipt of such complaint, the commission shall follow the procedure and exercise the powers and duties provided in §§4-21-115--4-21-124, inclusive, and said person shall have all rights provided therein. [Acts 1976 (Adj.S.), ch. 457, §1; 1979, ch. 104, §1; 1979, ch. 222, §1; T.C.A., §8-4131.]
8-50-104. Employment of the handicapped--Assistance programs--Studies.--It is the policy of the state to give positive emphasis to the recruitment, evaluation, and employment of handicapped persons in the public service. The department of personnel shall develop methods and programs to assist and encourage the departments, agencies and institutions of the state and the various political subdivisions of the state in carrying out the stated policy and shall provide for appropriate study and review of the employment of handicapped persons in the public service. Private employers in the state may in like manner develop policies for complying with the provisions of §8-50-103. [Acts 1976 (Adj.S.), ch. 457, §2; T.C.A., §8-4132.]
4-21-124. Civil action--Injunction--Damages, costs, attorneys fees.--Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in chancery court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her, together with the costs of the lawsuit, including a reasonable fee for his or her attorney or record, all of which shall be in addition to any other remedies contained in this chapter. [Acts 1978(Adj.S.), ch. 748, §26; T.C.A., §4-2124.] (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint alleges that plaintiff was denied employment by the Tennessee Department of Human Services because of her handicap of manic depression which is treatable with the medication, Lithium, and that she is able to function in a totally normal manner.
The complaint prays that plaintiff be awarded the position of Junior Eligibility Counselor for Maury County, pay from March 20, 1981, costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys fees “for both her administrative hearings and this cause” .
The answer admits that plaintiff met the minimum qualifications for the position sought and that plaintiff was “first on the register” , but denies that plaintiff’s condition constitutes a handicap within the meaning of TCA §8-50-103 and asserts that plaintiff’s condition would have prevented plaintiff from performing or would have impaired her performance of the duties of the position sought, and further avers that plaintiff was less qualified than the persons selected and that this action is barred by the one year statute of limitations, TCA §28-3-104.
Plaintiff responded that the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of administrative action before the Tennessee Commission for Human Development under TCA §4-21-115--4-21-124, and that the complaint was never pursued by the administrative agency “for lack of funds” .
[Lower Court’s Decision]
On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Chancellor ruled that the statute had not run because of the good faith effort to pursue her administrative remedy.
Upon trial of the cause, the Chancellor found:
1. That Ms. Nelle Peebles was qualified and competent to hold the position of Junior Eligibility Counselor at the time she interviewed for the position.
2. That Mrs. Greenhalgh and Mrs. Thornthwaite, the applicants chosen over Ms. Peebles, were better qualified than Ms. Peebles.
3. That Mrs. Nancy Thomas, the Human Services County Director who rejected Ms. Peebles, was conscious of and gave some weight to Ms. Peebles’ old emotional problem.
4. That Ms. Peebles suffers from manic depression but has had the disorder under control for several years through the use of lithium.
5. That Ms. Peebles had an unusually emotional reaction to some of Mrs. Thomas’ statements at the March 20, 1981 interview.
6. That this reaction of Ms. Peebles was not a result of manic depressive illness; but was instead, a result of the same kind of stress and strain that might arise when an Eligibility Counselor interviews an applicant for one of the assistance programs.
7. That the emotional reaction was clear evidence of Ms. Peebles’ sensitivities about her condition and her sensitivities about the fact that others in the community, including Mrs. Thomas, knew of her previous problems.
8. That it was not inappropriate for Mrs. Thomas to consider that emotional reaction in evaluating Ms. Peebles’ ability to confront and properly handle stressful situations that might develop in her employment, if hired.
...
The Court concludes that Ms. Peebles was rejected by the Department of Human Services for reasons other than her handicap.
As stated, plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.
[Appeal]
On appeal plaintiff submits two issues as follows:
I.
Whether the Trial Judge erred by applying a too narrow definition of “handicap” based upon present, physical or mental illness and not including within the protection of the law those well persons cursed with the stigma of having once suffered mental illness.
II.
Whether the evidence presented preponderates against the judgment of the Trial Judge and in favor of the Appellant.
Defendants assert an additional issue of statute of limitations.
[Discussion]
Since this case was tried by the Chancellor without a jury, his findings of fact are reviewed by this Court de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TRAP Rule 13(d).
In cases tried orally by a judge without a jury, any conflict in testimony requiring a determination of the credibility of a witness or witnesses is for the trial judge whose decision thereon is binding upon the reviewing court unless other real evidence compels a contrary conclusion. State ex rel Balsinger v. Town of Madisonville, 222 Tenn. 272, 435 SW2d 803 (1968).
Appellant’s brief does not specify what finding or findings of the Chancellor are considered contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. No complaint is made of the finding, (1) that plaintiff was qualified and competent, (2) that the County Director was conscious of and gave weight to plaintiff’s old emotional problem, and (3) that plaintiff is subject to manic depression which is under control by use of the drug, lithium.
Apparently, appellant takes issue with the other findings of the Chancellor numbered 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
[Facts]
The uncontradicted facts as to comparative qualifications (finding no. 2) are as follows:
Plaintiff attended Sullins College, and later received a degree in art with a minor in fashion design. Since 1960, plaintiff has been employed for one year teaching elementary and junior high students, and has worked as a display and portrait artist. She has no experience in social work. During the course of her employment interview, there was a discussion of the stress involved in the job she sought. Plaintiff inquired whether her mental and emotional problems would influence the decision as to her selection to which the interviewer responded that the knowledge of the problem could not be totally removed from her memory. At this point, plaintiff suffered a seizure of weeping and screaming which terminated the interview.
Another applicant, Ms. Thornthwaite, had a master’s degree in health and safety, had ten hours of psychology and applied sociology, had taught personal hygiene and health at the University of Southern Mississippi and had worked at a Human Services day care center. The matter of stress involved in the job sought was discussed with this applicant without undue reaction.
Another applicant, a Ms. Greenhalgh had taken 36 hours of psychology, nine hours of sociology, 4 1/2 hours of social work, 4 1/2 hours of child welfare and 4 1/2 hours on the American family. She had worked as a secretary for the Department of Social Work at Middle Tennessee State University and as a social worker at a nursing facility. The matter of stress on the job was discussed with this applicant without undue reaction.
Ms. Thornthwaite and Ms. Greenhalgh were selected in preference to plaintiff for employment as Junior Eligibility Counsellor, the duties of which were to interview members of the public seeking assistance from the Department of Human Services.
[Comparative Qualifications]
It is clear from the evidence that, disregarding any emotional disability of plaintiff, the qualifications of Ms. Thornthwaite and Ms. Greenhalgh were superior to those of plaintiff. The evidence preponderates in favor of and not against the Chancellor’s second finding.
[Emotional Stability]
As to the 5th, 6th and 7th findings of the Chancellor, it is undisputed that there was a strong emotional reaction by plaintiff during her employment interview. The only controversy is concerning the cause of the reaction. The interviewer testified that the cause originated in the manner above stated. Plaintiff told a somewhat different version but does not deny the exhibition of strong emotion. The Chancellor’s 5th finding does not refer to the source or cause. The evidence preponderates in favor of the 5th finding and not against it. The Chancellor’s sixth finding indicates that he considered the cause of the emotional reaction to be immaterial, so long as the cause was in keeping with the type of situation which the applicant would probably meet in the course of carrying out her duties as a Junior Eligibility Counsellor. This Court agrees with the Chancellor in this finding. Little imagination is required to conceive of plaintiff interviewing an applicant for assistance who knows of and mentions plaintiff’s difficulty and suggests that she is not qualified for the job she holds. Even less imagination is required to conceive of plaintiff’s probable reaction.
In this respect, it is reasonable to conclude that the emotional temperament of plaintiff (in the words of the statute):
[t]o some degree prevents the applicant from performing the duties required by the employment sought or impairs the performance of the work involved.
The evidence does not preponderate against the sixth finding of the Chancellor, but in favor of it.
The eighth finding of the Chancellor is in reality a conclusion in which this Court concurs.
The unnumbered conclusion of the Chancellor is the subject of extensive argument by plaintiff which will now be discussed.
Plaintiff conceives that the Chancellor dismissed her suit because he did not consider her difficulty to be a handicap within the meaning of the above statute. This Court considers unnecessary the determination of the nature or extent of plaintiff’s difficulty until it be determined that failure to hire plaintiff was (in the words of the statute)
[d]iscrimination--based solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap of the applicant--(and that) such handicap (does not) prevent the applicant from performing, or interfere with the performance....
This Court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff’s difficulty (or history of difficulty) was not the sole cause of the “discrimination” (selection of others) and that plaintiff’s difficulty (or history of difficulty) was such as to reasonably prevent plaintiff from performing the duties of the job as well as the other two applicants and to interfere with such performance.
Although the foregoing renders unnecessary any consideration of the nature and degree of handicap contemplated by the statute, it is appropriate to observe that the statute does not mention specifically the difficulty of emotional disorder. If, however, the word, emotional should be included in the word, “mental” , nevertheless, the word “handicap” is a term of degrees and comparisons. A person may be slightly, moderately or severely handicapped. A person of moderate ability may be handicapped in comparison with a person of outstanding ability. A person of modest education may be handicapped in comparison with a person of extensive education. A talented person whose talents do not include the duties of a position may be handicapped in comparison with a person of mediocre talent who has a special talent for the duties of a position.
In the present case, the plaintiff was obviously handicapped in comparison with the other two applicants in respect to scholastic preparation and employment experience; but this handicap can hardly be considered within the contemplation of the statute.
If, as insisted, plaintiff’s “handicap” has been successfully and totally eliminated by the use of lithium, then her difficulty is not a present handicap, but a former handicap. If the history or reputation of the former handicap was a factor in plaintiff’s rejection, then it is doubtful that the statute is applicable, for it does not refer to a history or reputation of formerly having a handicap. If the statute does refer to former history or reputation, then its application is limitless: recovered alcoholics, completely rehabilitated cripples, recovered victims of various diseases and many other similar situations would be covered by the statute. This Court does not conceive that the intent of the statute is so broad.
Plaintiff argues that certain circumstances point conclusively to unlawful discrimination in her rejection. Among those mentioned are:
1. No guidelines or directives.
2. No observance of an Executive Order.
3. Plaintiff’s top position of eligibility.
4. Plaintiff’s admitted qualification for the job.
5. The report of the interviewer and county manager to her superior that: I have not recommended Ms. Nelle Peebles to a Junior Eligibility Counsellor--because it is common knowledge in Columbia that she has a history of emotional and/or psychological problems.
6. That no effort was made to confirm plaintiff’s stabilization by lithium.
7. That no evidence was offered to contradict such stabilization.
8. The statute was intended to address wrongs of the character represented herein.
Each of the first seven listed circumstances would have some relevance if it were not for the fact that there were valid grounds of rejection other than plaintiff’s emotional handicap or history of the same. The existence of such other grounds prevents the handicap from being the sole ground of discrimination.
The report to the superior which mentioned only the history of emotional or psychological problems is, of course a circumstance, but it was explained satisfactorily by the writer of the report; and, even unexplained it does not conclusively require a finding that a handicap was the sole cause of rejection and that it did not in any way impair the ability to perform.
Plaintiff’s point no. 8, above, is not a circumstance but an argument. This Court respectfully disagrees with the argument that the statute was intended to assure against discrimination against an individual under the circumstances of this case.
Plaintiff relies upon the finding of the Chancellor that the official who failed to select plaintiff “was conscious of and gave some weight to Ms. Peebles old emotional problems” . This reliance is misplaced, for the statute does not forbid consideration of handicaps, it forbids discrimination based solely upon a handicap which does not prevent or impair the performance of duties. A discrimination which is based in part upon a handicap and in part upon other sufficient grounds is not forbidden by the statute.
Discrimination is not per se immoral or illegal. Discrimination is a process of selection which is inherent in virtually all activities of life. Discrimination is undesirable only when it is not based upon proper grounds.
Plaintiff argues that the defendants are “estopped” by the formal report filed by the official who rejected plaintiff. Estoppel does not run against the State. Tennessee Board of Dispensing Opticians v. Eyear Corp., 218 Tenn. 60, 400 SW2d 734 (1966); State, ex rel Moulton v. Williams, 207 Tenn. 695 (1961); Murfreesboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 193 Tenn. 34, 241 SW2d 862 (1951). The official who filed the report might be estopped to deny the truth of the contents of the report, but that official is not a party to this suit. The official was a witness, and the report was admissible in impeachment of her testimony, but it was not conclusive but subject to explanation by the witness. Graham v. McReynolds, 90 Tenn. 673, 18 SW 272 (1891); State v. Hicks, Tenn. Cr. App. 1981, 629 SW2d 908, cert. den.; Garrett v. Tenn., 103 S.Ct. 1212, 459 U.S. 1214, 75 L.Ed. 451. The contents of the report are not denied. The facts stated therein are true and were considered by the appointing authority. The report does not state that plaintiff’s rejection was based solely upon a handicap which did not prevent or impair performance, nor did it state that plaintiff was handicapped. It stated merely:
[i]t is common knowledge in Columbia that she has a history of emotional and/or psychological problems.
It is unfortunate that the rejecting official did not record the other reasons for rejection which have been demonstrated in this record. However, the disposition of this case must rest upon the facts shown in this record, and not merely the facts in the filed report.
In a discrimination case, the plaintiff has the initial burden of showing unlawful discrimination. When there has been a prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination, the burden of proceeding shifts to the defendant to disprove unlawful discrimination by offering evidence to contradict the evidence of the plaintiff and/or to show a legitimate and sufficient reason for the discrimination. When the defendant has offered evidence of a valid reason, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to contradict the legitimate grounds shown by defendant or to show that they are merely pretextual. The ultimate burden of proof of unlawful discrimination rests upon the plaintiff. United Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikins [31 EPD ¶33,477 ], 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed. 2d 403 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine [25 EPD ¶31,544 ], 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1088, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green [5 EPD ¶8607 ], 411 U.S. 492, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
The evidence preponderates in favor of the findings of fact of the Chancellor. This Court concurs in the findings of fact and conclusions of the Chancellor.
The foregoing renders unnecessary any consideration of the defense of statute of limitations.
The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the plaintiff. The cause is remanded for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary and proper.
Affirmed and Remanded.