Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 39 EPD ¶35,813, Bernice P. Goodrich, Plaintiff v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Defendant., (Dec. 30, 1985), (Dec. 30, 1985)
Bernice P. Goodrich, Plaintiff v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Defendant.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.Civil Action No. 81-3214, December 30, 1985
Equal Pay Act of 1963
Wage Differentials--Skill Required--Labor Union Experience.
--A female employee of a labor union did not prevail on her claim that she was being paid less than five male coworkers for the same work. Her job did not require the type of labor union experience and skill that the men’s jobs entailed.
Back reference.-- ¶522.35 .
Issuing decision on merits in (DC DofC 1983) 32 EPD ¶33,756 , 712 F2d 1488.
Johnson, D.J.: Bernice P. Goodrich brings this action against the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, (IBEW) pursuant to the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the Act), 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1976). Alleging that IBEW has violated the Act by paying her less than five male employees with whom she does equal work, she seeks damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. During the trial of this case, the Court received and evaluated the testimony of witnesses, reviewed the exhibits admitted into evidence, and heard the argument of counsel. After careful consideration of all evidence of record, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
1. Bernice Goodrich, employed since 1952 at the IBEW’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., commenced this action on December 31, 1981.
2. In 1961, she began her present position as an “agreements analyst” in the agreements approval department. The primary function of the department is to review labor agreements that local unions submit to the International President for approval.
3. The department is headed by a director, William Ferry, and has a professional staff of six employees, five males and plaintiff. The five male staff members are Robert Damiani, John Dalton, Stan Hubbard, William Shank, and Richard Willaert.
4. Of the six staff members, only Goodrich is classified as an agreements analyst. the five make employees hold the position of either “International Representative” or “Senior International Representative.”
5. There are currently 72 International Representatives assigned to national headquarters and who staff several other departments and offices.
6. International Representatives status at the IBEW’s headquarters is entirely dependent upon active membership in the union. All professional employees at the union’s headquarters who have been active members of an IBEW local hold the International Representative title, and only active union members, pursuant to the IBEW “membership rule,” are eligible for designation as International Representatives. The agreements approval department is one among many areas of the union’s professional operations in which International Representatives work.
7. Dalton, Damiani, Hubbard, Shank, and Willaert have been assigned to the agreement approval department as their primary duty during the following periods:
Dalton: February 1, 1974 to present.
Damiani: February 14, 1977 to August 19, 1980; November 20, 1982 to present
Hubbard: November 1981 to present.
Shank: November 1979 to present.
Willaert: September 15, 1977 to present.
8. Neither Dalton nor Willaert has ever ben assigned to another IBEW department. Hubbard rotated through several different departments when he became an International Representative in May 1981 until his assignment to the agreements approval department six months later.
9. Plaintiff has been paid the following annual salaries during the relevant back pay period:
1979--$24,494.00
1980--$26,795.00
1981--$30,030.00
1982--$31,783.00
1983--$33,444.00
Her current salary is $36,046.00.
10. From January 1979 to October 1982, Dalton and Shank were paid $44,000.00 per year. Willaert’s annual salary was $29,900 from January 1979 until September 1979; $36,400 from September 1979 to September 1981; and $44,000 a year from September 1981 until October 1982. Damiani’s annual salary was $36,400 from January 1979 to May 1979 and $44,000 thereafter.
11. In October 1982, the annual salary of each of the five male employees was increased to $54,000 and a year later to $56,862.
12. Four male employees, unlike plaintiff, receive paid parking privileges at IBEW headquarters worth several thousand dollars a year.
13. International Represesntatiives are selected by the International President of the IBEW, who is currently Charles H. Pillard.
14. It is and has been the policy and practice of the International President to choose as International Representatives only members of the IBEW who have been active in one of its local unions.
15. This policy and practice is known as the “IBEW Membership Rule.”
16. Every person selected as an International Representative since Mr. Pillard became International President in 1968 has been an active IBEW member.
17. The salary of Senior International Representatives is established by the quadrennial International Convention and incorporated in the International Constitution.
18. As part of the IBEW membership rule, it is and, at all relevant times, has been the policy and practice of the IBEW to pay non-International Representatives less than the salary established by the quadrennial International Convention for Senior International Representatives.
19. International Representatives are employed on the condition that they are subject, at the discretion of the IBEW International President, to any substantive or geographic assignments which he deems necessary.
20. International Representatives are not assigned permanently to a particular department within the IBEW International Headquarters but are subject to transfer and assignment where needed.
21. International Representatives, including those assigned to the agreements approval department, are required to perform many functions and address many different kinds of labor union problems other than agreement approval.
22. These functions include assisting and advising local unions affiliated with the IBEW in collective bargaining; conducting and assisting in organizing compaigns; assisting in the labor-management disputes at the national and local levels; advising and assisting in a large variety of international union matters; participating in and attending meetings and conferences of different kinds; assisting the IBEW in collective bargaining-related legislative and political activities either for the IBEW alone or together with the AFL-CIO, other international unions, and intermediate, state, or local labor organizations and bodies.
23. International Representatives, while they are assigned to the Agreement Approval Department, are subject to other assignments outside the Agreement Approval Department.
24. International Representatives assigned to the Agreement Approval Department perform other duties such as processing requests for strike sanctions from local unions affiliated with the IBEW, investigating delinquent payments owed to the National Electricians’ Benefit Fund (NEBF), reviewing special project agreements, and drafting special contract language.
25. Plaintiff’s job description does not require the same level of expertise in overall union activities nor the ability to perform other essential union functions when required.
26. Three of the International Representatives presently assigned to the Agreement Approval Department have been assigned to other departments of the IBEW.
27. Plaintiff, having never been an active member of the IBEW, is precluded by the IBEW membership rule from becoming an International Representative.
28. The IBEW membership rule has been applied equally and without exception to males and females.
29. Most International Representatives, prior to selection, were members of an IBEW local for more than 15 years and held one or more positions of leadership within the local.
30. The IBEW membership rule is designed to assure that International Representatives have direct practical experience with apprenticeship programs, grievance arbitration, contract negotiation and administration, internal local union affairs, jurisdictional disputes, and other labor union issues.
31. The salary established by the membership at the IBEW quadrennial International Convention for Senior International Representatives is also intended as special recognition for members who have well-served the union through their locals.
32. In the Research and Education Department, all employees, without regard to sex, are classified as “Senior Research Analysts” and “Research Analysts” but are not International Representatives.
33. Senior Research Analysts and Research Analysts, who prepare analyses of local union agreements for use by IBEW local unions in collective bargaining, must have a college degree or equivalent experience with an emphasis in one of the following areas: (1) industrial relations; (2) industrial engineering; (3) eocnomics; (4) statistics; (5) labor law; or (6) business administration.
34. Senior Research Analysts, both male and female, are paid $34,600 per year. Their salaries are negotiated by the IBEW and Local No. 2, Office and Professional Employees Union (OPEIU).
35. The duties and responsibilities of Senior Research Analysts and Research Analysts are substantially similar to plaintiff’s position.
36. A non-bargaining unit employee, such as plaintiff, receives annual salary increases which generally reflect the percentage increase negotiated by the IBEW with OPEIU Local No. 2 for employees in the bargaining unit. There are eleven non-bargaining unit employees with salaries higher than plaintiff’s.
37. The overall work responsibilities of International Representatives are distinctly different from that of plaintiff, notwithstanding that one segment--analysis of agreements--may be identical to the work performed by plaintiff.
38. Damiani, in addition to his duties in the agreements approval department, has since January 1979 made two presentations at workshops concerning the work of the department for visiting field representatives; attended the annual Construction Conference where he assisted in registering delegates; attended a 1983 manufacturing conference where he listened to political speeches; attended the 1983 AFL-CIO Legislative Conference; and for approximately six months was assigned to “handbill” on behalf of the IBEW during an organizing campaign several times a week before reporting to the agreements approval department.
39. Dalton, in addition to his duties in the agreements approval department, has since January 1979 worked on a security detail at the annual Construction Conference from 1979-1982; attended the Legislative Conference, 1979-1982; and generally assisted with certain administrative duties at the 1982 IBEW Convention. Moreover, he assists officers from local unions on matters of concern.
40. Hubbard, in addition to his duties since January 1979 worked on a security detail in 1982 and 1983 at the one day Construction Conference; assisted in the registering of guests at the 1982 IBEW Convention; attended the 1982 and 1983 Legislative Conference; and attended an awards banquet presented by his local union.
41. Shank, in addition to his duties in the agreements approval department, has since January 1979 made presentations to visiting field representatives on the work of his department; and performed limited research in another department upon assignment by his superior; and serves as a resource to the manufacturing department where previously assigned.
42. Willaert, in addition to his duties in the agreements approval department, has since January 1979 worked on a security detail at one one-day Construction Conference and attended one Legislative Conference to observe; attended the 1982 IBEW Convention where he was assigned to meet convention guests at airports and escort them to hotels and the convention center. Moreover, he attended seminars and consulted with officers of local unions.
43. Plaintiff, as early as 1968, advised officials of IBEW that the pay disparity between her salary and the salaries of male International Representatives violated the Act.
44. Plaintiff and IBEW have stipulated as follows:
That the nature of work performed by plaintiff Goodrich is “equal” within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act to the work performed by International Representatives of the IBEW at such times as such Representatives are assigned to and physically performing work in the Agreements Approval Department.
45. The employees in the agreements approval department, including plaintiff, review and analyze labor agreements to determine if such agreements comport with IBEW policy. In this respect, the work performed is equal.
46. Plaintiff is never assigned any responsibilities outside the department and is classified as an office employee.
47. The other five employees are classified as International Representatives and are assigned responsibilities outside the department.
48. The testimony with respect to additional assignments within the department by the male employees is not credited as being inconsistent with the stipulation between the parties.
49. The testimony of the Administrative Assistant to the International President is credited as to the assignment of the five male employees to perform various union functions in addition to their responsibilities in the agreements approval department and that they are required to perform more functions than plaintiff.
50. International Representatives are not hired for one specific job but are rotated within international headquarters as necessary and are subject to any union assignment at the discretion of the International President.
51. The five International Representatives with whom plaintiff compares her work have been assigned to organizing compaigns, handbilling, conducting workshops or training seminars, attending conferences and conventions, and generally assisting in union activities. Although all five International Representative have not been called upon to perform the same tasks or given identical responsibilities outside the agreements approval department, they are utilized at the discretion of the International President to further the interest and goodwill of the IBEW.
52. The presence of International Representatives at industry conferences and conference sponsored by other unions serves important interests of IBEW.
53. The experience, skill, and responsibility of the five International Representatives currently assigned to the agreements approval department are superior to those possessed by the plaintiff with respect to overall union duties.
54. The male employees in the agreements approval department perform work, and are required to perform work, outside the department that cannot be compared with the work performed by plaintiff. The International Representatives have, or are subject to, responsibilities which transcend the responsibilities of the agreements approval department.
55. The additional responsibilities of the International Representatives, although not easily quantifiable, are nonetheless clear.
56. Plaintiff has not sustained her burden of demonstrating that the work she performs is equal or substantially equal to the work performed by the five male employees with whom comparison has been made.
57. The union “membership rule” appears to be neither unreasonable nor utilized in bad faith.
58. Defendant has sustained its burden of demonstrating its affirmative defense that a factor other than sex justifies the wage differential and such differential in pay is excluded from the statutory prohibition of wage discrimination based on sex.
Conclusions of Law
The Court has jurisdiction over this Equal Pay Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343(4), and 329 U.S.C. §216(b). Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). Plaintiff is employed by the IBEW, an incorporated labor organization, which is an employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(d) and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §206(a) .
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1) .
To establish a violation of the EPA, plaintiff must prove that defendant has discriminated on the “basis of sex” in wage rates paid to employees performing equal work within the meaning of the statute. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan [7 EPD ¶9374 B], 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). An employer violates the EPA by paying unequal wages for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions.” Thompson v. Sawyer [28 EPD ¶32,668 ], 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Equal work is thus defined in the EPA as equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. All four components must be met for the equal pay standard to apply. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. [12 EPD ¶11,216 ], 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, [16 EPD ¶8140], 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Moreover, the EPA is a remedial statute which is to be liberally construed in favor of its intended beneficiaries.
It is well-settled that the jobs need not be identical in every respect before the EPA becomes applicable. The accepted standard of equality is “substantially equal.” A wage differential is justified only if it compensates for “an appreciable variation in skill, effort or responsibility.” Id. In any EPA action, the initial question is are the jobs equal. The burden of proof is on plaintiff to demonstrate that she performs equal work and not merely that a wage differential exists. The jobs must be compared in light of the full factual situation and the broad remedial purpose of the statute. In determining whether plaintiff and the male employees, with whom she has compared jobs, perform substantially equal work, only the primary duties of each job are compared and duties which are insubstantial and incidental to the performance of each worker’s primary function are ignored in the job comparison. Once plaintiff meets her burden, the burden then shifts to defendant to show that the pay differential was justified under one of the exceptions to the EPA: “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1)(1976) .
The work performed by plaintiff as an agreement analyst is not equal to the work performed by the male International Representatives with whom she compares herself because her job does not require the same skill or carry the same burden of responsibility as do the jobs of the International Representatives. An evaluation of the skill required to perform a job, according to the administrative regulations implementing the EPA, 29 C.F.R. §800.125 , should take into account factors like the experience, training, education, and ability requirements of the jobs. It is evident that here there is no distinction made between education and ability of plaintiff and the male employees but the latter do require a background of knowledge and experience which plaintiff’s job does not require. The length and breadth of experience required of the male employees are necessary to perform the wide range of assignments given them as representatives of the IBEW and such assignments are not given to plaintiff. Accordingly, the compared jobs do not entail “equal skill.” The job of the International Representative requires more skill than the job of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s job does not require the type of labor union experience and expertise to perform other union functions, as needed. In addition, the job of plaintiff is not of equal responsibility to the job of an International Representative. The degree of accountability of an International Representative to the IBEW far exceeds the degree of responsibility of an agreement analyst. The International Representative performs a variety of additional duties as representatives of the IBEW for which they are uniquely qualified by virtue of their union membership and involvement in union affairs.
The crucial question under the EPA is not whether one sex possesses additional skills or responsibilities but whether the nature of the duties actually performed requires or utilizes those additional skills. Plaintiff contends these additional duties involve only minimal time and are peripheral importance and, thus, do not justify a wage differential. Notwithstanding this contention, the evidence is clear and convincing that International Representatives are more accountable for assuring that the mission of the IBEW is met than the responsibilities of an agreement analyst. The additional duties of the International Representatives involve representing the IBEW in providing a full range of services to its current locals and in obtaining new members and locals in the electrical industry. Although the additional duties, as plaintiff correctly contends, are not necessarily extensive, the quality of the duties may not be ignored. The extra tasks performed by the male employees, as evidenced by their testimony, may indeed consume only a minimal amount of time but they are not of peripheral importance. Indeed, these tasks are significant and essential to the operation and mission of the IBEW. Further, consideration must be given to the fact that such additional duties are assigned at the discretion of the International President. These additional duties are not demanded to frustrate the EPA by calling for extra duties only occasionally or from only one on two International Representatives but rather constitute the manner in which the IBEW has determined to best facilitate its mission.
In determining whether there is equal responsibility, the overall job requirements must be measured. A review of the evidence in this case clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the difference in responsibility is so significant that such alone could contribute to the pay disparity. The overall jobs of the male employees, not the individual segment; i.e., analyzing agreements as does plaintiff, must be considered. Plaintiff and defendant have stipulated the Court accepts as undisputed fact that the nature of the work performed by plaintiff Goodrich is “equal” within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act to the work performed by International Representatives of the IBEW at such times as such Representatives are assigned to and physically performing work in the Agreements Approval Department. This stipulation on which plaintiff relies so heavily is, however, very limited when the full scope of the responsibilities of International Representatives is, and must be, considered. The stipulation does not foreclose consideration of the flexibility expected of and, at times, demanded of the male employees. Further, the stipulation is limited to the assignment to and the physical performance of the analysis of agreements. The evidence is clear and convincing that plaintiff was hired as an agreement analyst in the Agreements Approval Department and her sole primary duty is to analyze agreements. On the other hand, the male employees with whom she has chosen to compare jobs were hired as International Representatives and have as their sole primary responsibility the role of International Representative at national headquarters. This primary responsibility often entails analysis of agreements--identical to the sole responsibility of plaintiff--but it also entails significantly more. The Court, therefore, concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case in that she has failed to demonstrate that the jobs of agreement analyst and International Representative involve equal skill and responsibility and are thus equal under the terms of the Equal Pay Act. Thus, the wage differential is not in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
Assuming arguendo that the Court found the work performed by plaintiff is substantially equal to the work performed by the International Representatives, the Equal Pay Act expressly excepts from its coverage pay differentials “made pursuant to ... a differential based on any factor other than sex.” The exception in 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1)(iv) for “a differential based on any factor other than sex” creates an affirmative defense which bars recovery notwithstanding a prima facie showing of unequal pay for equal work. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan [7 EPD ¶9374 B], 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974). It is no answer to the fourth affirmative defense that the contrasted jobs are equal, even if that be true. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. [5 EPD ¶8434 ], 473 F.2d 589, 594 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied [6 EPD ¶8861], 414 U.S. 866 (1973). The IBEW membership rule is a “factor other than sex” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1)(iv) of the Equal Pay Act. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan. Any non-sexual factor based on an employer’s legitimate business judgment may be a factor other than sex within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1)(iv) . Bence v. Detroit Health Corp. [32 EPD ¶33,726 ], 712 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1983).
In the instant case, the IBEW membership rule serves two legitimate business purposes. First, the requirement that all International Representatives must be active members of an IBEW local union assures that Representatives will have the required special expertise to perform the variety of assignments necessary to fulfill the union’s mission. Second, the salary established by the quadrennial International Convention for Senior International Representatives is deemed a reward to IBEW members who have actively served their local unions for long periods of time and as an incentive to younger members. The evidence presented by defendant explains the wage differential between plaintiff’s position and that of the International Representatives. Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. [30 EPD ¶33,123 ], 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court concludes from all the evidence that the wage differential results from inequality in work assignments rather than sex discrimination. Further, defendant need not prove that the wage differential between plaintiff’s position and the International Representatives is job-related in order to prevail under the fourth affirmative defense. County of Washington v. Gunther [26 EPD ¶31,877 ], 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. [30 EPD ¶33,123 ], 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. [5 EPD ¶8434 ], 473 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied [6 EPD ¶8861], 414 U.S. 866 (1973). It is sufficient that the facts show: 1) the IBEW, for non-discriminatory reasons, determined that the IBEW membership rule serves the organization’s legitimate business interests, and 2) the rule has been applied equally and without exception to males and females and accounts for any pay differential which may exist. In enacting the Equal Pay Act, Congress did not intend for the courts or administrative agencies to substitute their judgment for that of the employer as to the reasonableness of such factors, so long as such factors are not used as a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. County of Washington v. Gunther [26 EPD ¶31,877 ], 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Indeed, the concept of “job-relatedness” is incompatible with the fourth affirmative defense in the Equal Pay Act. The language of the fourth affirmative defense excepts, in the broadest possible terms, pay differences made pursuant to a differential based on “any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. §209(d)(1)(iv) (emphasis added). The legislative history confirms that Congress intended the full breadth of this language. See e.g., 109 Cong. Rec. 9196 (Rep. Frelinghuysen) ( “the only thing prohibited is a difference in pay that is based solely on sex” ); 9198 (Rep. Goodell) (sex “is the sole factor that we are asserting here as a restriction” ); 9203 (Rep. Griffin) ( “iv is a broad principle ... it should be clear ... a wage differential based upon any factor other than sex is not a violation” ); 9206 (Rep. Goodell) ( “there are many factors that can be taken into consideration in working out differentials of pay among employees ... which would be proper under this legislation so long as they were based on those factors and not on the basis of whether employees are women or men” ). Nowhere in the legislative history does it appear that for a factor to be “any other factor other than sex,” it must be job-related. Imposing a test of job-relatedness on the fourth affirmative defense would render it meaningless. The defense is stated as an exception to the Act, applicable only after the plaintiff has proved equal work. “In providing for exceptions, the statute states that they will apply when the males and females are doing equal work.” Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., supra, 473 F.2d 594. To satisfy a job-relatedness test, a defendant would have to show that the “other than sex” factor is related to job performance--in other words, that the factor makes a difference in the performance of the plaintiff’s job.
A final, and independently sufficient barrier to applying a test of job-relatedness under the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act is the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Washington v. Gunther [26 EPD ¶31,877 ], 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Gunther was a wage discrimination case arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e), et seq. At issue in Gunther was the construction of the “Bennet Amendment” in §703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-2(h), which exempts from §703’s proscription, wage differentials “authorized” by the Equal Pay Act. The Supreme Court held:
... [I]ncorporation of the fourth affirmative defense could have significant consequences for Title VII litigation. Title VII’s prohibition of discriminatory employment practices was intended to be broadly inclusive proscribing “not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co. [3 EPD ¶8137 ], 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The structure of Title VII litigation, including presumptions, burdens of proof, and defenses, has been designed to reflect this approach. The fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, however, was designed differently, to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination. H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). Equal Pay Act litigation, therefore, has been structured to permit employers to defend against charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are based on a bona fide use of “other factors other than sex.” [footnote omitted] Under the Equal Pay Act, the courts and administrative agencies are not permitted “to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer ... who [has] established and employed a bona fide job rating system,” so long as it does not discriminate on the basis of sex. 109 Cong. Rec. 9209 (Statement of Rep. Goodell, principal exponent of the Act).
452 U.S. 170-171.
Thus, if ordinary statutory analysis left any doubt, the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunther establishes that “job-relatedness” is incompatible with the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act. See also, Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. [30 EPD ¶33,123 ], 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff presented evidence which indicates that only ten out of 319 International Representatives hired by the IBEW since 1961 have been female. This, she contends, proves that the IBEW membership rule, although facially neutral, perpetuates the underrepresentation of females among the IBEW’s International Representatives and, therefore, undermines that rule as a bona fide “factor other than sex.” However, the Court finds this evidence is not dispositive of this issue. Such a theory could apply if an employer abandoned a sex-segregated pay scale only to replace it with a pay scale keyed to the former rates of pay. The new pay scale, although facially neutral, would perpetuate the employer’s past sex discrimination and therefore could not be said to be a factor “other than sex.” But simply stated, there is no causal relationship between the IBEW membership rule and evidence of underrepresentation of women among International Representatives. To make a perpetuation argument in this case, plaintiff would have to show that the sex-neutral IBEW membership rule screens out women at a higher rate than men. Plaintiff has not been denied IBEW membership and she does not claim that IBEW membership is unavailable to women generally. Moreover, even assuming the IBEW membership rule somehow explained the alleged underrepresentation of females among International Representatives, it does not account for the wage differential between plaintiff’s job and that of the males; inasmuch as it is uncontroverted that female International Representatives are paid the same salary as their male counterparts.
Plaintiff also argues that the IBEW membership rule is, in fact, a pretext for international discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Schultz v. First Victoria National Bank [2 EPD ¶10,075 ], 420 F.2d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1969) ( “illusory” training program); she contends the invocation of the IBEW membership rule does not explain or justify the wage differential between her position and the International Representative. However, unrebutted evidence established that the salary of every non-bargaining unit employee, including plaintiff, was established on the basis of a rational and reasonable comparison with the salaries of employees represented by OPEIU Local No. 2 and, where appropriate, the salaries of workers of comparable skill, training and experience in the Washington, D.C. labor market. The International Representatives’ salary, on the other hand, is established by the rank and file membership of the IBEW at the quadrennial International Convention, and as an incentive to those IBEW members who possess the special expertise desired by the union to accept appointment as International Representatives. This evidence does not support Ms. Goodrich’s contention that the IBEW membership rule is a sham to conceal discrimination “on the basis of sex” in wage rates paid to employees performing “equal work” within the meaning of the EPA. The Court concludes that the interpretation of the membership rule is neither unreasonable nor made in bad faith.
Accordingly, judgment should be entered for the defendant and against the plaintiff.