Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 20 EPD ¶30,156, Desria D. Pradia, Plaintiff v. Gulf Oil Company, Defendant., (July 25, 1979), (Jul. 25, 1979)

Desria D. Pradia, Plaintiff v. Gulf Oil Company, Defendant.

United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.Civil Action No. 76-H-1801, July 25, 1979

Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964

Prerequisites to Suit--Timely Court Filing--EEOC Redetermination of Reasonable Cause.

--The EEOC’s redetermination of reasonable cause does not revive a charging party’s right to file suit in federal court. Thus, a bias complainant who failed to file suit within 90 days after being notified of the EEOC’s “no reasonable cause” determination with respect to his charges was not given a second chance to file suit when the EEOC changed its determination from no reasonable cause to reasonable cause.

Back reference.-- ¶2124 .

Craig A. Washington, Houston, Texas, for Plaintiff.

William C. Duck, Houston, Texas, for Defendant.

Sterling, D.J.: Presently pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant’s motion is based on its contention that Plaintiff’s Title VII complaint was, in part, untimely filed. Plaintiff has filed two charges of discrimination with the EEOC. His first charge, filed on August 5, 1974, complained of Defendant’s failure to promote or transfer him. On February 6, 1975, Plaintiff filed his second charge alleging that Defendant was harassing him because he filed the original charge with the EEOC.

With respect to the first charge, on March 24, 1975, the EEOC notified the parties of its determination that reasonable cause did not exist to believe that Title VII had been violated. Plaintiff was further informed that he had the right to file suit within 90 days after the receipt of the March 24, 1975 letter. Plaintiff did not file suit within that time period. On September 25, 1975, the EEOC withdrew the March 24 determination of “no reasonable cause” and re-determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that Title VII had been violated with regard to Plaintiff’s denial of promotion charge. The original determination of no cause concerning Plaintiff’s transfer claim of discrimination was not changed. On August 19, 1976, the EEOC issued notices of right to sue for both charges of discrimination. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on November 2, 1976.

The question presented here is a narrow one: whether the EEOC’s redetermination of probable cause can revive a charging party’s right to file suit in federal court. The applicable statute, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-5(f)(1) provides that suit must be commenced by an aggrieved party within 90 days after the EEOC has given notice that it has not been able to conciliate and that it will not sue. The relevant regulation, 29 C.F.R. §1601.19b(d), provides:

The District Directors, or other designated officers, on behalf of the Commissioner, may, upon completion of an investigation, dismiss charges, make and issue determinations as to reasonable cause, and serve a copy thereof upon the parties, and make and approve conciliation agreements in those cases where such authority has been delegated to them by the Commission. The determination is final when issued; therefore, requests for reconsideration will not be granted. The District Directors, or other designated officers, may, however, on their own motion, reconsider their determination at any time and, when they do so, they shall promptly notify the aggrieved person, the person making the charge on behalf of the aggrieved person, where applicable, and the respondent, or in the case of a charge filed under §1601.10, the person aggrieved, if known, and the respondent of their subsequent decision on reconsideration.

The determination of reasonable cause is part of the administrative process and has ramifications only in the administrative sphere. If the Commission determines that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that Title VII has been violated, it will dismiss the charge. If, on the other hand, the Commission determines that reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII has taken place, it will endeavor to eliminate such violation informally through its conciliation efforts. 29 C.F.R. §1601.19b(a). The absence of an EEOC finding of reasonable cause does not bar suit under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, [5 EPD ¶8607 ] 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). The Plaintiff was not misled in any manner that he did not have the right to file suit even though the EEOC had dismissed his charge on a finding of no cause. The March 24 no cause letter was accompanied by a Notice of Right to Sue. Plaintiff chose not to follow up on his first charge of discrimination by filing suit. This Court holds that the fortuitous fact that the EEOC issued a redetermination on its own motion regarding part of Plaintiff’s charge does not revive his right to sue in federal court.

As set out above, §1601.19b(d) provides that the cause determination is final when issued and that requests for reconsideration will not be granted. The effect of allowing a redetermination to revive a party’s right to sue would be to allow the EEOC to enlarge the statutory time limits beyond the 90 days prescribed by Congress. Such a result was not sanctioned in an analogous situation where the EEOC was sending out “two-tiered letters” to enlarge the statutory time period. See, e.g. Zambuto v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., [13 EPD ¶11,385 ] 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977). It is, therefore,

Ordered that Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted. This case will proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s claims based on his second charge to the EEOC only.