Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 18 EPD ¶8800, Officers for Justice et al., Plaintiffs v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. C-73-0657 RFP., (Sep. 22, 1978), (Sept. 22, 1978)
Officers for Justice et al., Plaintiffs v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. C-73-0657 RFP.
United States District Court, Northern District of California., September 22, 1978
Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964
Court Jurisdiction--Claims Under Other Laws.
--Claims filed under the civil rights statutes of 1866 and 1871 could not be used as a basis for application of the legal principles of the 1964 law to an examination system for police appointments. The statutes are separate, and subsequently filed EEOC charges could not cure the untimeliness of such charges. The complainants were not, therefore, entitled to incorporate by reference under the 1964 law the previous history of the litigation.
Back reference.-- ¶2112 .
State and Local Government--Suit by Attorney General--Authority.
--The authority of the U.S. Attorney General to bring an action challenging the legality of examinations for municipal police was unaffected by the 1972 amendments to the Act transferring from the Attorney General to the EEOC the authority to bring suits against employers in private industry alleging broad patterns and practices of discrimination.
Back reference.-- ¶2194
State and Local Government--Suit by Attorney General--Preliminary Requirements--EEOC Investigation.
--An investigation, conciliation efforts and referral by the EEOC of charges of discrimination are not conditions preliminary to the initiation of a suit by the Attorney General to seek relief for employees of state and local government. The point was clarified by the President’s Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978.
Back reference.-- ¶2194 .
Suit by Attorney General--Time Limits.
--Since an action by the Attorney General challenging alleged broad patterns and practices of discrimination against employees of a local government are brought primarily to enforce public interests and public policy, the absence of a federal time limit does not subject the action to state statutes of limitation. There are no time limits for such suits, and the actions of a municipal police department could be challenged to the date the law was made applicable to it.
Back reference.-- ¶2194 .
Revenue Sharing Act
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968
Legal Standards--Intentional Discrimination.
--The legal standard used for determining unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 civil rights law, rather than the constitutional standard requiring a showing of intent to discriminate, is applicable to claims of discrimination violative of the federal funding laws. Regulations promulgated under these laws specify the applicable legal standards. Thus, appointments and promotions of police personnel on the basis of examinations that were violative of Title VII are unlawful under these statutes.
Back references.-- ¶216 , 2194 .
Court Action--Time Limits.
--The most nearly analogous state time limits are not applicable to suits brought by the Attorney General under the nondiscrimination provisions of the federal funding laws since the actions are being brought to enforce the rights of the federal government regarding the expenditure of federal funds.
Back references.-- ¶216 , 2194 .
Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964
Police Examinations--Eligibility Lists--Appointments.
--The appointment and promotion of police personnel on the basis of eligibility lists that resulted from examinations not validated to show job relatedness were unlawfully discriminatory, even though the examinations themselves, which had a disparate impact on racial minorities, were administered prior to the Act’s becoming applicable to local government employees.
Back reference.-- ¶1137.15 .
Granting partial summary judgment in (DC Ca. 1977) 14 EPD ¶7549 , which issued an injunction after order in (DC Ca. 1977) 14 EPD 7548 , following (DC Ca. 1975) 11 EPD ¶10,618 , which granted partial relief in (DC Ca. 1973) 6 EPD ¶8956 , 371 F. Supp. 1328.
Robert Gnaizda and Lois Salisbury, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs Officers for Justice.
Gerald F. George and Linda C. Jamieson, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for Plaintiffs United States of America.
Michael C. Killelea, Philip S. Ward, and Stephanie Chang, San Francisco, California, for Defendant City of San Francisco.
Jerome Defilippo and Kenneth Harrington, San Francisco, California, for Defendant Chief of Police, Charles Gain.
Stephen Solomon and Ralph Saltzman, Los Angeles, California, for Intervenor-Defendants Police Officers Association.
[Statement of Case]
Peckham, C.J.: This action is presently before the court on the plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment regarding entry-level (Q-2) examinations administered from 1969 through 1972 and the sergeant’s promotional-level (Q-50) exam administered in 1971 by the Civil Service Commission for the San Francisco Police Department. Although the private plaintiffs originally filed this motion in March of 1978, at their request the motion was not taken under submission by the court at that time. In July 1978, private plaintiffs renewed their motion, and oral argument was held on July 28. At oral argument, the United States, plaintiff in the consolidated action, C-77-2884 RFP, joined in the private plaintiffs’ motion. The court provided the parties with additional time to file briefs on the additional issues raised by the United States’ joinder in the motion, and the matter was then taken under submission. After careful consideration, and for the reasons which follow, we now grant the United States’ motion and deny the private plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The record before the court on these motions is quite extensive. In 1973, a lengthy hearing was held that resulted in the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the continued use of the entry-level and sergeant’s promotional-level examinations by the defendants. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of San Francisco, [6 EPD 4 8956] 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Much of the evidence introduced at that proceeding involved the adverse impact on minorities and the validity of the examinations involved in these motions. For the purposes of their motions for partial summary judgment, both public and private plaintiffs rely not only on the evidence introduced in the 1973 hearing, but also on the Stipulation of Facts filed April 17, 1978, the Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts filed July 24, 1978, and the stipulation of all parties except the United States of March 11, 1977, to the effect that the record developed in the 1973 hearing would constitute the entire record as to the examinations involved here unless notice to the contrary was given by a certain date in the fall of 1977.
No party indicated any intention to introduce any additional evidence pertaining to these examinations until July 26, 1978, two days before the oral argument of these motions. On that date, defendants filed the Declaration of Gregory Winters, which asserted that if the persons taking the 1971 Sergeant’s (Q-50) exam were ranked solely on the basis of test performance, leaving out the effect of points added to test scores for seniority, veteran’s preference, and good conduct, there was no adverse impact on minorities. The affidavit was altogether conclusory, and utilized figures at odds with those listed in the Stipulation of Facts previously filed. This declaration was stricken by the court at oral argument on July 28 for failure to comply with Local Rules 220-3 and 220-8. Some two and one-half weeks after oral argument, on August 16, 1978, defendants filed a Second Declaration of Gregory Winters, to the same effect, but providing somewhat more of an explanation of the methodology employed in reaching its conclusion. For the same reason the first declaration was stricken, and also because its submission clearly violates the stipulation of the parties of March 11, 1977, this second declaration will not be considered by the court on this motion. We consider the submission of these declarations as simply a last ditch attempt by the defendants to stave off a final determination regarding these examinations on the already extensive record that they have stipulated to be the complete record.
The Private Plaintiffs
The private plaintiffs’ action, filed in April of 1973, was originally brought under 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983 and provisions of the United States and California Constitutions. Thus our 1973 preliminary injunction order did not directly involve Title VII. Officers for Justice, [6 EPD ¶8956 ] 371 F. Supp. at 1330. However, we did apply Title VII principles, as set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., [3 EPD ¶8137 ] 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in our analysis. 371 F. Supp. at 1331-36 (citing Bridgeport Guardians Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, [6 EPD ¶8755 ] 482 F.2d 1333 (2nd Cir. 1973), and others.) Such an analysis of claims under the federal Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983 is clearly no longer the law. See Washington v. Davis, [11 EPD ¶10,958] 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Moreover, application of the Title VII legal standard to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §1981 is also in doubt, although this question should be resolved by the Supreme Court in its next term in Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [15 EPD ¶8046 ] 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 3087 (1978). Apparently for these reasons, private plaintiffs rest their partial summary judgment motion on their Title VII claim only, which claim was added by an amendment to their complaint filed January 6, 1977.
The first question we must face, then, is whether we have jurisdiction under Title VII over the examinations involved here. The first filing of a charge with the EEOC by one of the plaintiffs herein, Officer Troy Dangerfield, occurred no earlier than July of 1976. For this court properly to have jurisdiction under Title VII, the charge must have been filed within 300 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., [9 EPD ¶10,082 ] 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975). [1] However, if the violation is a continuing one, as opposed to a discrete incident, our jurisdiction is proper so long as the continuing conduct being challenged extended into the 300-day period. Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., [4 EPD ¶7787 ] 335 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. W.Va. 1971). An incident occurring before then, or a continuing course of conduct ending more than 300 days before the filing of a charge, is in the words of the Supreme Court, “merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, [14 EPD ¶7577 ] 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). In determining whether there is a continuing violation, “the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists.” 431 U.S. at 558 (emphasis in original).
No further appointments at the entry level were made from the eligibility lists that resulted from the Q-2 examinations involved here after the issuance of the preliminary injunction in November of 1973. Some sergeant-level appointments were made with the court’s permission after the issuance of the preliminary injunction from the eligibility list resulting from the 1971 Q-50 examination. The last such appointment was made on September 18, 1974, far more than 300 days before the first EEOC charge was filed. The private plaintiffs, however, contend that this court nevertheless has Title VII jurisdiction over these examinations on the theory that they constituted a continuing violation. We believe that our prior ruling on this question, expressed in our Memorandum and Order of June 30, 1977, was an accurate statement of the law on this point. We there stated, referring to the exact same examinations involved in this motion, that
... no use has been made of these examinations for several years, either by administering the examination itself, or by appointing persons qualifying pursuant to the examination. Although the effects of these discriminatory examinations may be continuing, the examinations themselves are no longer continuing violations of Title VII. Thus, no plaintiff can be viewed as having filed a timely charge with the EEOC challenging these examinations.
Memorandum and Order of June 30, 1977, at 5-6 (footnote omitted emphasis in original).
The private plaintiffs also argue an alternative basis for this court’s Title VII jurisdiction over the examinations whose use was enjoined in 1973. They contend that their subsequently filed EEOC charges cured any previous defects in our jurisdiction since the initial complaint provided the defendants with full notice of the acts and practices which were alleged to be discriminatory. However, that initial complaint made no mention of any alleged Title VII violations, and no such violations were alleged until the filing of the private plaintiffs’ first amended complaint on January 6, 1977. This fact alone clearly distinguishes this case from our decision in Jones v. Local 3, International Union of Operating Engineers, 13 EPD ¶11,489 , P.P. 6740, 6741 (N.D. Cal. 1976), and the cases cited therein, upon which the private plaintiffs now rely. When the instant action was first filed in 1973, the legal standard applied by almost all courts with regard to claims under sections 1981 and 1983 were virtually identical to that applied to Title VII claims. However, we now feel constrained to hold that the filing of private plaintiffs’ section 1981 and 1983 claims in 1973 did not give the defendants adequate notice of subsequent EEOC charges, so as to avoid the normal operation of the 300-day limitation for Title VII claims. The Supreme Court has clearly expressed its view that 42 U.S.C. §1981 and Title VII provide entirely separate and independent remedies, and the invocation of one has no effect on the other. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, [9 EPD ¶10,149 ] 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (filing of EEOC charge under Title VII does not toll §1981 statute of limitations). See also Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., [12 EPD ¶11,256 ] 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., [7 EPD ¶9148 ] 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
In sum, we remain in agreement with our previous statement that “plaintiffs ... cannot incorporate by reference under Title VII the entire history of this litigation.” [2] Thus, the private plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment must be denied for lack of proper jurisdiction under Title VII as to the examinations enjoined in November 1973.
The United States
The United States filed its complaint against the City and County of San Francisco on December 22, 1977, alleging not only a pattern and practice of discrimination violating Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1976), but also violations of the nondiscrimination provisions of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, as amended, 31 U.S.C. §1242(a)(1) (1976); and of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §3766(a)(1) (1976). The United States seeks summary judgment in its favor under all three statutes with regard to the same examinations challenged by private plaintiffs.
To begin with the Title VII claim, defendants first argue that the Attorney General was not authorized to bring this action at all. Section 707(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6(c) , which was added by the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, provides that “the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the [EEOC]” as of March 24, 1974. Read literally, as the defendants would have us do, the Justice Department was stripped of all authority to bring pattern and practice suits under Title VII after March 1974. A few courts have indeed ruled that the Attorney General has no authority to bring such actions. United States v. Pima County, Community College District, [11 EPD ¶10,868 ] 409 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Ariz. 1976); United States v. Fresno Unified School District, 11 EPD 7775 (E.D. Cal. 1976). However, we are of the opinion that the better view is expressed by the court in EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 EPD ¶10,271 , 5134, at 5136 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (dicta), aff’d [9 EPD ¶10,147] 515 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1975), which stated that “Section 707(c) provided for a transfer of private sector pattern and practice cases from the Attorney General to the [EEOC], ... leaving the Attorney General with authority to sue only public sector employers for pattern and practice discrimination.” See also Ramos v. Port Authority, 12 EPD ¶11,035 , 4819 n.1 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). The applicable legislative history clearly supports this view that Congress intended section 707(c) to transfer only private sector pattern or practice cases to the EEOC. See Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, at 895, 1858, 1860 (1972).
In any case, since this suit was filed, the authority of the Attorney General to bring suits such as this has been altogether clarified by the President’s Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, submitted to Congress on February 23, 1978, and approved by Congress on May 5, 1978. The message of the President accompanying the Reorganization Plan, [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 593, and the reports of both houses considering the Reorganization Plan, S.Rep. No. 95-750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), H.R. No. 95-1069, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978) all clearly indicate that the Plan does not alter previous law, but merely clarifies the original intent of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII to preserve the Attorney General’s jurisdiction to bring pattern and practice suits against state and local governments. The section of the Reorganization Plan clarifying this authority became effective July 1, 1978, via an Executive Order signed by the President on June 30, 1978.
We recognize that “the views of a subsequent Congress about the meaning of earlier legislation may under particular circumstances form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” United States v. Baltimore County, [17 EPD ¶8509 ] Civil No. 1178-836 (D. Md., July 3, 1978) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, [14 EPD ¶7579 ] 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965)). However, we need not rely upon the opinions expressed by the President, House and Senate to uphold the Attorney General’s authority here. Whatever the situation may have been before July 1, 1978, it is unequivocally clear that since that date, the Attorney General has had the express authority to bring this pattern and practice action under Title VII. Thus we could simply dismiss the present Title VII claim and allow it to be refiled. However, since we can see no prejudice that may result to the defendants whatsoever, [3] we will not require such a needless formality.
[EEOC Referral]
Defendants next argue that the Attorney General may not bring a pattern and practice suit under Title VII until a charge of discrimination has been processed through the investigation and conciliation procedure of the EEOC and referred to the Justice Department. As with the question of the Attorney General’s authority to bring pattern or practice suits at all, the statutory language that this argument is based on, sections 706 and 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 , -6 (1976), is less than a model of clarity. But this question was also addressed by the President’s Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, with the result that as of July 1, 1978, it is clear that the Justice Department is free to bring these suits without a prior referral of a charge from the EEOC. Even absent the effect of the Reorganization Plan, we would read section 707 as not requiring a referral from the EEOC before the Attorney General could bring a pattern or practice action against a public sector employer, but especially in light of the Reorganization Plan now in effect, and the lack of prejudice to the defendants in dispensing with a needless refiling, we conclude that the lack of a referral from the EEOC is no bar to the Title VII claim of the United States in this action.
[Time Limit]
The defendants’ final contention with regard to the Title VII claim of the United States relates to the statute of limitations. Title VII does not specify any statute of limitations for actions either by the EEOC or by the Justice Department alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination. The defendants contend that the proper statute of limitations is thus the most nearly analogous state limitations period, which defendants say would be section 338(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, providing a period of three years for suits on causes of action created by statute. Thus defendants argue that the period of possible liability as to the claims of the United States begins no earlier than December 22, 1974. Since the last use of any eligibility list resulting from the examinations we are considering here was on September 18, 1974, defendants conclude that there cannot possibly be any liability on the claims of the United States regarding these examinations.
Our disagreement with this logic comes at the point where the defendants adopt the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations. This is indeed the general rule when a federal statute provides no express statute of limitations, but as is usually the case in the law, there is an exception to the rule. “[W]hen the federal government or one of its agencies is the plaintiff suing to enforce rights belonging to the sovereign, state statutes of limitations are not applicable.” EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., [10 EPD ¶10,440 ] 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing United States v. Georgia Power Co., [5 EPD ¶8460 ] 474 F.2d 906, 923 (5th Cir. 1973)). See generally United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1940). Griffin Wheel went on to hold that an EEOC pattern or practice action under §706 of Title VII, insofar as the EEOC seeks to enjoin practices contrary to the strong public policy expressed by Title VII, is a suit “to enforce rights belonging to the sovereign,” and state statutes of limitations do not apply.
On the other hand, Griffin Wheel distinguished that part of the EEOC’s action seeking back pay for the affected individuals, holding that this was in the nature of a private action and thus subject to the state statute of limitations. The decisions of two other circuits, however, have gone further, holding that even as to back pay, state statutes of limitation do not apply to an EEOC pattern or practice action under Title VII. EEOC v. Occidental Life Insurance Co., [11 EPD ¶10,954 ] 535 F.2d 533, 537-40 (9th Cir. 1976), aff’d, [14 EPD ¶7619 ] 431 U.S. 355 (1977); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., [9 EPD ¶9952 ] 511 F.2d 1352, 1359-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, [10 EPD ¶10,511] 423 U.S. 994 (1975). But cf. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 431 U.S. at 381-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Thus the rule in this circuit is clear that statutes of limitations do not apply to pattern or practice actions initiated by the EEOC. It is equally clear that the same rule must apply to pattern or practice actions initiated by the Attorney General under section 707 of Title VII, for, if anything, it is even clearer that suits by the Attorney General are brought primarily to enforce public interests and public policy. We conclude then that state statutes of limitations do not apply to the Title VII claims of the United States in this action and that “there is simply no governing federal limitations period.” EEOC v. Occidental Life Insurance Co., [11 EPD ¶10,954 ] 535 F.2d at 537. As a result, we hold that the United States may properly challenge the actions of defendants back to the effective date of Title VII as against them, which is March 24, 1972.
[Claims Under Funding Laws]
Next, we turn to the United States’ claims under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3701 et seq. (1976), and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, as amended, 31 U.S.C. §1221 et seq. (1976). The nondiscrimination provisions of these statutes, which the United States is seeking to enforce here, are virtually identical. Thus it will suffice to quote just one of them:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, or sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity of a State government or unit of local government, which government or unit receives funds made available under ... this chapter....
42 U.S.C. §1242(a)(1) (1976).
The defendants initially contend that the proper standard to be applied under these two statutes is the intentional discrimination standard of Washington v. Davis, [11 EPD ¶10,958] 426 U.S. 229 (1976). However, the implementing regulations under each of these statutes specify that the applicable legal standard for their antidiscrimination provisions is that of Title VII. 28 C.F.R. §42.203 (1977); 31 C.F.R. §51.50 et seq. (1977). These regulations, duly promulgated according to statute, [4] have the force of law and thus are binding on the court. United States v. City of Chicago, [13 EPD ¶11,380 ] 549 F.2d 415, 440 (7th Cir. 1977). See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §5.03 (1958).
[Time Limits]
The defendants also argue that the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations should be applied with regard to these claims since no other limitations period is specified. But the Attorney General clearly brings these claims in order to enforce the rights of the federal government regarding the expenditure of federal funds, and state statutes of limitation are thus inapplicable. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
[Appointments from Eligibility Lists]
We are now in a position to consider the merits of the United States’ motion for partial summary judgment, to determine whether there is an issue of material fact as to whether the entry-level (Q-2) police officer examinations given from 1969 through 1972, and the sergeant’s-level (Q-50) examination given in 1971, violated Title VII. There is little else that need be added to our November 1973 Memorandum of Decision. The statistics as to these entry-level examinations which were incorporated in our previous decision, Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of San Francisco, [6 EPD ¶8956 ] 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 n.2, are now stipulated to: [5] “[W]hites taking the admission test for patrolmen passed the test with a frequency more than five times greater than minorities.” 371 F. Supp. at 1331-32. This examination, consisting of a general aptitude test, was administered a number of times during the period 1969-72, and entry-level patrolmen were appointed from the resulting eligibility lists. Although all of these examinations were actually administered prior to the effective date of Title VII for local governments, appointments from the resulting eligibility lists continued after the date that Title VII went into effect against the defendants on March 24, 1972. Any appointments made after that date from an eligibility list derived from a discriminatory examination violated Title VII. Bannerman v. Department of Youth Authority, [16 EPD ¶8145 ] 436 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Even if the eligibility lists resulting from some of the administrations of this exam had expired by the effective date of Title VII, at the least the differential pass rate statistics for all of the administrations may be aggregated by the court in order to provide a statistically significant indication of whether the test had an adverse impact on minorities. The entry-level examinations administered during this period were all the same, or virtually so. In such cases, the evidence of discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII can support the inference that discrimination continued after the effective date since the “relevant aspects of the decisionmaking process had undergone little change.” Hazelwood School District v. United States, [14 EPD ¶7633 ] 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.15 (1977). Here the decisionmaking process underwent no change whatsoever. In short, we concur with our previous statement that “plaintiffs ... present more than enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of de facto discrimination with respect to San Francisco’s procedures for the hiring of policemen.” 371 F. Supp. at 1332-33.
A similar analysis applies to the plaintiffs’ prima facie case as to the 1971 sergeant’s-level examination. Although the exam was administered before the effective date of Title VII, appointments from the resulting eligibility list were made even after the preliminary injunction was issued in November of 1973. The parties have now stipulated to virtually the same statistics as were relied upon by the court in 1973. [6] We noted in 1973 that “whites passed the [1971 sergeants’] examination with a frequency more than three times greater than minorities,” and we held that “[t]he evidence, in short, establishes a prima facie showing of de facto discrimination with respect to the sergeant examination.” We now reaffirm that conclusion.
Once a prima facie case of employment discrimination has been established, the burden is on the defendant to prove the “business necessity” or “job-relatedness” of the challenged practice. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., [3 EPD ¶8137 ] 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Justification of an employment test having an adverse impact on minorities as job-related involves demonstrating the test’s content or predictive validity. From the beginning of this litigation to the issuance of the preliminary injunction in 1973, and indeed continuing to the present day, defendants have made little or no effort to demonstrate that the examinations involved here are valid. [7] We thus have little to add to our previous discussion which held that the defendants had not met their burden of proving the job-relatedness of these examinations. 371 F. Supp. at 1336-39. The only additional point worth noting is that the record now includes an analysis by an outside consultant, commissioned by the City of San Francisco, of the content validity of several of the examinations used by the defendants, including the 1971 sergeant’s exam. [8] That consultant concluded that the content validity of these examinations was “at best, quite low.”
Therefore, on the basis of the extensive record before the court, which has been stipulated to be the complete record as to these issues, we conclude that there is no remaining issue of material fact, and find that the use of the entry-level examinations administered from 1969-72, at least insofar as the resulting eligibility lists were utilized in making appointments after March 24, 1972, and the use of the sergeant-level examination administered in 1971 constituted an unlawful employment practice violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Summary judgment may thus be granted as to the plaintiff United States on their Title VII claim regarding these examinations.
[Violation of Funding Laws]
Turning again to the United States’ claims pursuant to the Crime Control Act and the Fiscal Assistance Act, we conclude that there are no outstanding material issues of fact with regard to these claims. The United States has submitted affidavits and documents altogether sufficient to demonstrate that the San Francisco Police Department has received revenue sharing funds under the Fiscal Assistance Act since 1973, [9] and LEAA funds under the Crime Control Act since 1968. [10] Defendants have not offered any affidavits or other evidence to contest this. Furthermore, we are satisfied, as a matter of law, that the San Francisco Police Department is a “program or activity,” as that term is used in these nondiscrimination provisions, 42 U.S.C. §3766 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §1242 (1976), and their implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. §42.202(g) ; 31 C.F.R. §51.51(i) . United States v. Baltimore County, [17 EPD ¶8509 ] Civil No. H78-836, slip op. at 11-12 (D. Md., July 3, 1978).
Since the legal standard to be applied under these statutes is that of Title VII, and since we have held herein that the use of the challenged examinations was an unlawful employment practice violating Title VII, it then follows that the same conduct violated the nondiscrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control Act and Local Assistance Act. Thus, summary judgment for plaintiff United States may be granted with respect to claims under these statutes as to the 1969-72 entry-level (Q-2) examinations and the 1971 sergeant-level (Q-50) examination.
[Rulings]
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the private plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment be denied. It is further ordered that the United States’ motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The United States is requested to submit proposed partial findings of fact and conclusions of law within 30 days.
It Is so Ordered.
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