Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 13 EPD ¶11,395, Dolores J. Copeland et al., Plaintiffs v. W.J. Usery, Jr., Defendant., (Jan. 06, 1977), (Jan. 6, 1977)

Dolores J. Copeland et al., Plaintiffs v. W.J. Usery, Jr., Defendant.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.Civil Action No. 74-1822, January 6, 1977

Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964

Court Procedures--Sex Discrimination Case--Attorneys’ Fees.

--Where a law firm’s clients were the prevailing parties in a sex discrimination suit brought under the Act against a government agency, that firm was entitled to attorneys’ fees based upon hours logged and computed at what the court felt was a reasonable rate.

Back reference.-- ¶2635 .

Awarding attorneys’ fees in (DC D. of C. 1975) 9 EPD ¶10,127 , 414 F.Supp. 644, after rulings in (DC D. of C. 1975) 10 EPD ¶10,241 , and grant of relief in (DC D. of C. 1976) 11 EPD ¶10,813 , 414 F.Supp. 647.

Gary D. Wilson, Mary McReynolds, and John H. Harwood II, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs.

Paul M. Tschirhart, Washington, D.C., Julian H. Singmen and James E. Carr, for Defendant.

GESELL, D.J.: The Court has before it an application for award of attorneys’ fees and costs submitted by the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering following completion of a Title VII sex discrimination class action. The firm’s clients were the prevailing parties. An award of $205,916.50, based on 3,602 hours logged, computed at an average hourly rate of $57.17 is sought.

The Secretary of Labor strenuously opposes. The Secretary does not dispute the fact that the hours claimed were logged nor does he seriously contest the average hourly rate. Rather, he makes a broadside attack on the amount sought, claiming “litigious overkill” by a large firm, the use of a lawsuit to train “relatively junior attorneys,” the “limited results achieved” in what he considers a “mutually cooperative effort,” and suggests that recognition of the award would create a “dangerous precedent” to the disadvantage of the American taxpayers. These comments are unwarranted and reflect unawareness of considerations which must be weighed when determining a reasonable fee in a complex litigation against the Government.

The Secretary apparently believes a fee award in a case of this type should be based primarily upon the monetary results achieved. This is an erroneous approach to the fee problem. While the actual cash awards to individual members of the class were in this instance relatively small in relation to the total fee claim, this was basically an equity action which was intended to and did achieve benefits that cannot be measured solely in monetary terms. The judgment, which has not been appealed, among other things established an entirely new pattern of training and promotion for female employees in an important segment of the Department of Labor which had blatantly discriminated against women. The benefits of the litigation will be felt for many years to come.

The complaint was filed in December, 1974, and the litigation was continuously active until completion in October, 1976. There were at least 15 separate court appearances, and approximately a dozen status conferences in chambers. Contested pretrial motions involving primarily documentary discovery were required, and the Clerk’s blotter reflects other contested motions and countermotions, all of which were throughly briefed and argued by both sides.

While the Secretary now suggests that there were really no serious issues at stake, this is not borne out by the facts. The litigation went forward in a relatively civilized manner but it was hard fought. The Government offered firm, persistent resistance throughout the litigation and concessions developed only as it became apparent there was little prospect of Government success. Indeed, the Government moved to dismiss at the outset, and it opposed discovery. There were many difficulties encountered during the discovery process which were caused, in part, by the Department’s inadvertent destruction of certain records contrary to Court direction and the intentional withholding of other documents by some officials of the Department of Labor, as well as by the complexity of the issues.

The 3,602 hours were logged almost entirely by associates of the firm with varying degrees of experience. The average rate of $57.17 an hour is well within the local range for associates of larger firms which is between $25.00 an hour on the bottom side to perhaps as much as $75.00 per hour on the top side. What plaintiffs’ counsel lacked in seasoned trial experience was offset by other factors. They were always well prepared, effective and knowledgeable. No time was deliberately wasted and counsel proceeded with full recognition of the congressional directive to expedite litigation of this type.

Billing for legal services, however, should not be a merely mechanical exercise. Where a fee is sought from the United States, which has infinite ability to pay, the Court must scrutinize the claim with particular care. When an application such as this is filed by a large law firm computing a proposed award by use of “customary rates,” the firm has obviously made little, if any, effort to exercise billing judgment. Thus an important ingredient is lacking. A reasonable fee can only be fixed by the exercise of judgment, using the mechanical computations simply as a starting point to reach a higher or lower figure. The Court must perform this function.

In considering what is a reasonable fee in this instance a number of factors deserve special mention. The proposed fee absorbs not only expensive overhead such as rent and secretarial services, but no charge has been made for what was undoubtedly a substantial amount of time spent by paralegals who play such a useful role in large documentary cases. On the other hand, there was practically no partner time expended on this case and the associates lacked experienced trial direction. The Court must also take into account the fact that not all of the work proved productive. Some issues which were joined in the complaint were dropped, as were some individual defendants. Taking into account each of the factors itemized in Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, [8 EPD ¶9661 ] 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), including the matters specifically mentioned, the Court has concluded that a reasonable fee in this litigation, weighing the results achieved, the novelty of the issues, the difficulties encountered and the effectiveness of the excellent representation given is $160,000.

The firm also requests an award for costs of $12,602.59. About half of this amount represents duplicating charges for documents and papers filed, computed at ten cents per page. This is a reasonable figure. Witness fees and filing costs totalling $40.00 and $34.00, respectively, are entirely in order. An item of $5,359.60 labelled “court reporting services” has been itemized and is fully supported as necessary and reasonable. Nine depositions were used at trial, five others were material and necessary as conditions existed prior to settlement of certain claims, and the cost of transcripts for actual proceedings was properly incurred. The request to compensate for telephone calls, postage and local transportation will be denied.

Accordingly, a fee for legal services of $160,000 is reasonable and costs are awarded in the total amount of $11,567.77. Enter judgment accordingly.

So Ordered.